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Thesis

# W. E. HOCKING'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Submitted by

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(A.B., Taylor, 1928)

In partial fulfilment of requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

1931

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## Acknowledgment

It would not seem right for me to send this thesis out without giving due acknowledgment to two sources which have been invaluable as a background for its preparation. For the past two years I have had the privilege of the instruction given in philosophy and theology by the Professors at the School of Theology. The insight into systems of philosophy gained from these courses has been most helpful. The second acknowledgment I want to make is to the unfailing patience and encouragement with which my major instructor, Dr. E. S. Brightman, has personally supervised the construction of this paper. At the same time I should not wish any one to judge the excellence and competency of either of these sources by the crudities of this paper: I shall personally take the credit for every one.

Elton Sletson

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# INTRODUCTION

## A. Statement of the problem

The subject of this thesis is the philosophy of religion of William Ernest Hocking, Alford Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University since 1920. Dr. Hocking's interests are broad and his treatment is fresh and original. He writes in a certain vigorous style which generally proves stimulating, but is often exceedingly fragmentary and disconnected.

I have endeavored in the outline of the thesis to assemble the points of thought which he himself has placed the most emphasis upon. They do not fall into a systematic whole as easily as I wish they did. What unity they possess may best be seen by observing in his treatment of them all a certain principle, the movement of which he has developed in a very original and suggestive way. At the point of its clearest expression he has called it the principle of alternation. Though used at times with a certain large freedom this principle is distinctive and fundamental to his thought. I have given it the name dialectic, and have endeavored to show it as the unifying principle or thread of his system. However, much greater emphasis must be placed on the subject matter than upon this dialectic principle.

The philosophy of Hocking is, as one of his critics says, a "modified idealism".[1] His background is influenced considerably by Hegel and Royce. He also shows a very distinct, though somewhat unsatisfactory personalistic tendency. I have not attempted to formulate a statement of the central motif of his philosophy.

But his great problem is to probe experience in an effort to discover the extent to which it yields answers to the problems of philosophy. At the center of experience he finds God, and also certain suggestions which he throws out as probable leads in solving the problems.

The task of this thesis is to attempt a unification of his loosely connected and often fragmentary considerations and to estimate their significance.

1. Its purpose and significance

The thesis has a two-fold purpose,--that of appreciation and of criticism. Today America stands in need of sane and wholesome idealistic thinking, and a thorough study of such men as Hocking ought to be well worth while. It strikes one as a sad fact that this nation, once distinctly religious at heart, should become, to the eyes of the rest of the world, one of the most materialistic of all nations. We of America may not be ready to agree with all that the world says about us, yet we have given it much cause for such an estimate.

At least we must admit that not idealism but pragmatism or instrumentalism, a distinctly positivistic philosophy, has the honor of being considered the great American philosophy. It is difficult to see in this philosophy any permanent foundation for a vital religion. At best its religion is vague and colorless. While we gladly agree that James contributed much to the psychology of religion and was in fact a religious apologist, yet John Dewey, the leader of pragmatism in its present popular form, is quite indifferent to all religion. William James was an exception among the positivists.

Neo-realism, another positivistic philosophy enjoying some popularity at the present time, is perhaps even less friendly to religion. Bertrand Russell, its English exponent, is distinctly hostile, while Perry is somewhat more friendly. But "realism explicitly repudiates every spiritual and moral ontology". It has no place for an abiding God.[2] Humanism, which is having great vogue at the present time, also rejects religion in its traditional theistic form. Humanism is uncertain just what part religion should play in society. These and other naturalistic systems find a ready hearing among a people already possessed with the scientific spirit. As a whole such philosophies are shallow and uncritical and often rest upon a false notion of religion and metaphysics.

Professor Hocking is a wholesome and steadying influence against these more shallow and transitory, popular philosophies. At the same time his ability to appreciate the true significance of them is remarkable. He carries this splendid quality almost to a fault. As O. de Selincourt says of him,

> "Professor Hocking has a most refreshing habit of expounding a theory as if it were his own and establishing it apparently to his own satisfaction, and then, without having prepared us for it in any way, of turning and rending it--though never without doing justice to its legitimate contentions. So great indeed is his power of sympathetic interpretation of other theories, and so much validity is he prepared to allow them, that it is not easy to decide where his own sympathies lie." 3

## 2. Its limits

Within the limits of such a paper as this, one can scarcely give adequate treatment to the broad system of philosophy found in Professor Hocking's writings. Many important implications of his

thought are undoubtedly omitted. His scope is so broad and comprehensive that we are often disappointed at his brief and fragmentary treatment of some of the fundamental problems of religion. He has but a brief treatment of such basic problems as those of immanence and transcendence. Any discussion of such problems as faith, love and forgiveness, are almost if not wholly lacking. The problem of sin, although treated with freshness and originality seems inadequate. In regard to punishment he seems in a measure of doubt as to its function and worth. The problem of immortality is almost entirely avoided, while his theory of freedom, though well defined, receives but fragmentary and scattered treatment.[4]

Professor Hocking is much more interested in presenting and powerfully illustrating his doctrine than in proving it. The reader has the feeling that the proof for which he eagerly seeks, often remains just out of reach.

On the whole his discussions are powerful and persuasive, but suggestive rather than assertive; he is never dogmatic. While attempting a few deductions from his general inferences I have not felt safe in straying too far from his own lines of argument. Thus some problems important to any thorough philosophy of religion will not receive treatment here in proportion to their importance.

## B. Materials and methods

There are two distinct sources of materials used in the preparation of the present paper. The first is the writings of Professor Hocking himself. The other is composed of reviews, comments and critical materials compiled from lists of periodicals

and contemporary works in the fields of philosophy, psychology, religion and ethics.

The one book which contains most nearly Hocking's philosophy of religion is his The Meaning of God in Human Experience, printed first in 1912, reprinted in 1913 and again in 1916. Human Nature and Its Remaking contains much of his ethical theory, and Man and the State, his political theory. His most recent book, Types of Philosophy, is valuable in giving the author's final statement of his philosophical position. His system of thought is fairly consistent throughout the period of these publications. [5]

Hocking is varied and individual in style, bordering at times on carelessness. Though not confined to any one method he may be said in general to reason inductively. He is also fond of the Emersonian style:--the cluster method. Unfortunately both of these are difficult for a beginner to master and are not easily arranged in orderly topical outline. I have found difficulty in adapting his argument to the latter method. It has also been difficult to keep the tone of the paper sufficiently normative--another fault, perhaps, of the beginner. Not a review, nor yet a criticism, but primarily an appreciation of the work of Hocking has been the aim of the paper. Critical material is for the most part left until the end of each chapter or between main sections of the argument.

# CHAPTER I

# ROOTS OF RELIGION

## A. Notion of instinct

The notion of instinct comes from an attempt to discover the hidden sources of human nature. Contrary to the idea of Rousseau that this "original" nature could be isolated and described as distinct from its environment, we must hold to a more abstract interpretation. We arrive at our notion of original nature from a hypothetical definition of those elements in life which show a degree of constancy, independent of changing conditions. "Instinct" is used to denote, not that part of heredity which is peculiar to the individual, but that part which is peculiar to the human race. It forms the starting point for a study of human nature. This view of instinct is naturalistic in as far as man becomes the result of a series of living forms on the earth. [6]

Such a notion of instinct contains first of all a picture of the biological mechanism of nerves and muscles by means of which an organism is able to react to its environment. This reaction is such as tends to promote the continuation of the species, characterizing its ways of life. Though these habitual responses are imperfect without practice they are effective from the beginning without either experience or instruction.

The 'stimulus' of action appears at first as an object of perception. It carries with it a presupposition or a pre-perception

of a certain type of response: an "anticipatory meaning" for the perceiving organism. This may be either positive or negative. Mr. Hocking thinks that the first sight of a pond of water must have some such meaning to the gosling. The same stimulus to the chick would receive an entirely negative response. This is not an a priori knowledge, rather an a priori expectation. The orderly development of this stimulus-response pattern becomes a vital part of the life of the organism: it undergoes modifications through experience, and ultimately becoming an individualized habit. [7]

1. The Range of Instinct

In early life human equipment seems very slender, being marked by an absence of fixed traits. In animals other than man the instincts seem much more pronounced, due, Mr. Hocking thinks, to a remarkable bodily structure together with an absence of the higher conditioning powers of the human mind. Difficulty in discovering the coarser criteria of human instinct is not due to the fact that they do not exist. But it is due to the setting off, or balancing of one instinct against another, to the infinite variety of pattern which any instinct may assume, and to the overlapping of the instincts. These three causes operating together make way for the infinite variety of response patterns.

It is not wise to attempt an hard and fast enumeration of the instincts, because of their great complexity. In general each positive instinct has its negative counterpart: viz., domination, submission. First to appear are the simple and primary instincts of physical activity. Then come the positive instincts of food getting, curiosity, and sociability: sex-love coming under the latter.

Pugnacity and fear are negative and are found as a part of all other instincts: curiosity and play are "general" positive instincts.[8]

Professor Hocking seems unsatisfied with any arbitrary classification of the instincts. He seeks rather some unifying principle back of them all. Around this central principle he groups the "necessary interests" of life. These pervade and direct the whole list of the more fragmentary impulses and reactions. "They would depend," he says, "not on specific routing of nervous energy, but on the nature of the nervous system itself." It is these necessary interests that are at once the most significant and the most obscure of original human tendencies, and are summed up in the idea of self preservation, the "will to live", or the "will to power".[9]

The problem of instincts is a difficult one and is far from being agreed upon. It is here that Hocking parts company with the cruder naturalistic view and with Behaviorism. Dr. McDougall has answered the problem by describing what he calls "purposive behavior". This is a long step in advance of the materialists. But the question remains, how far back can you carry the concept of purpose into the dawning of instinct?[10] Professor Perry comes forward with the idea of logical necessity.[11] Dr. Edgar Pierce with his panpsychistic or mentalistic theory would explain these dawning instincts, and subsequently the fully flowered personality, by the word "process". All comes from the backlying mental ground of existence. He thinks that to suggest an a priori principle which points to an Absolute only pushes the problem farther away.[12] But brushing away all other theories as incomplete and unsatisfactory

is exactly what Professor Hocking seems intent on doing. Back in the indistinct and difficult beginnings of individuality Hocking finds an Other. Is this the recourse of those who fear to think through? Or is it rather the only sane solution.

## 2. The will

In the unitary self all experiences are referred to a common interest. The idea of good, though often lying in the subconscious, dominates this common interest: and thus, experience becomes a selective process, continually seeking a better good. Each unitary self acquires an interpretation of its own good, i.e., its dominant interest. This may be stated as the will to live 'as a man', inadequately interpreted by the Nietzschian phrase as the "will to power". The different instincts are but manifestations of this unifying principle. The food-getting instinct is an active impulse in this direction. The play instinct seems to be but "practice in mastery". Fear is this impulse on its negative side. And sex-love primarily is "potency in search of a sanction".

True, Nietzsche was mistaken, but not in his quest. He took the idea of the will to power to be completely adequate, which was a mistake. To him this power could only be attained at the expense of love to mankind, whereas the two are inseparable. Hocking also gives acknowledgement to Freud in his similar search for a dominant interest of life, though he failed to find an adequate answer. [13]

Though the will to power is an inadequate expression of the thought he has in mind, he adopts it "as a working name for the instinctive center of the human will". But now that we have come face to face with will, how shall we analyze will? Here Hocking

introduces something new. Human instincts, from the standpoint of physical theory, are such stuff as the solar systems are made of. But from the metaphysical standpoint they are such stuff as dreams, ideas, and reasoning are made of. But will must do something, it must release energy. This output of will comes to us as feelings, desires. "Feeling is a mass of ideas at work within us." It is our experience of mental activity. It is the point at which the self realizes itself in the process of apprehending reality. [14]

Thus we return to a more careful survey of feeling, more particularly for this paper, the religious feeling.

B. Feeling

There are three currents of thought which demand that the validity of our ideas be treated by some higher court of appeal. (1) Psychology is quite in agreement that "nothing is real unless it belongs to conscious experience". (2) Biologists think that "only in the form of feeling can consciousness accompany the organism". (3) For the Pragmatist, the thing which works is the real, the valuable. This emphasis on value-consciousness as against fact-consciousness tends to assign a higher degree of reality to feeling than to idea. In these three feeling becomes the test and ground for our ideas. [15]

But, the deepest of all feelings are religious. The religious motive contains the secret of all costly and "death involving" loyalties such as loyalty to the State, or to any noble cause. Professor Hocking thinks it is "man's leap, as an individual and as species, for eternal life in some form, in presence of an awakened fear of fate". Here the will to live is equivalent to this deep religious feeling. They are not two facts but one. Incidentally

it would seem that the fear motive which is considered by Hocking as a negative instinct would be hardly sufficient ground for this greatest of human motivations. Perhaps he did not intend it to be considered as such. But a noble idealism will call out "death-involving" loyalties as quickly and efficiently as will fear.

The history of religion, he points out, has been an interpretation of feeling. But the question arises, Does this experience which arises in feeling (of one kind) also end in feeling (of perhaps another)? Is feeling justified by feeling or does it rise in something essentially different? [16]

## I. Limitation of feeling

Though religion may be permeated with feeling it has always been a feeling which has concerned itself about truth, purpose, and metaphysical reality. It has been a feeling about the universe and the relation of the universe to the self. The strength of the prophet has been a strength built upon selflessness in the face of an overpowering conviction of the reality of God to whom he is obligated. If the prophet is mistaken then practically the whole of religion becomes a profound self-deception. It is only the reality of the objective Other which gives strength and authority to the individual personality. A mere series of sensations will scarcely support the superstructure of a personality, or the still deeper implications of a metaphysical ground for the world. [17]

### a. The field of the intellect

To my mind this intimation of the need of an objective reality is important and fundamental, and it is the basis of all Theism. The tremendous amount of energy expended by human beings throughout

the centuries in establishing and defending the intellectual ingredients of religion has not been in vain but has established to the satisfaction of each advancing generation this profound conviction that the ideal is the Real. The Being worthy of praise is infinitely more than the objectification of human desire. The cry of the heart is not one of despair but of hope. Here is where we must firmly and definitely part company with certain of our contemporary prophets. The controversy is raging between Theism and a vague, groundless positivism which denies in effect both idealism and freedom, leaving but little place for man in its soulless universe. But it is not all easy travelling for the idealist, for here we will note what Hocking points out as a fundamental dilemma in the theory of religion: As has been intimated not only is there an essential Otherness about religion but there is also, on the subjective side, idea, as well as feeling. [18]

b. The conflict of feeling and idea

Man must ever attempt what seems to be impossible. He must endeavor to interpret his Object of religion into thought. He must give it meaning. In so doing he risks on the one hand the danger of running into vague and contentless speculation, and on the other, of bringing his Object so low that it becomes an apology for every human weakness. At the same time Object and subject are separate, for the religious Object is not identical with his world, neither with human beings.

Professor Hocking finds this fundamental dilemma clearly reflected in the history of speculative thought as a great schism. In the Middle Ages it became clearly articulate in the cleavage between the Scholastics on the one hand and the Mystics on the

other. The problem is also clearly represented in the thought of Kant. In Psychology it is the problem of feeling on the one hand and cognition on the other. Recent conclusions in the field of psychology give us a clue to the solution of the dilemma: here the problem is no longer either--or, but becomes both--and. [19]

c. The destiny of feeling

The previous discussion has in a measure presupposed Hocking's idea as to the destiny of feeling.

Feeling taken alone is something of a closed circle or rather an infinite succession of such circles. It seeks its satisfaction, but immediately ceases upon the realization of its goal. But that is not final, for, "one feeling debouches in another, or the appeasement of one hunger sets in motion the spring of another. Thus emotion maintains a perpetual circle while life lasts". This closed circle is self-destructive in that it finds no resting place,-no ultimate satisfaction. It never gets beyond itself.

In seeking to get out of this circle we turn to that other element in feeling, namely idea. Now ideas seek expression, the end of which is "animated cognizance" of their object. Thus Hocking contends that "all positive feeling.....reaches its terminus in knowledge." And "Religion as feeling must aspire to complete transformation of all its emotion into a present knowledge of its desired object, whatever that may be". [20] In our study of the roots of religion we have one further problem: Sin and its intimate relation to what we know as conscience.

C. Conscience

Conscience seems to be an elemental deposit in man's original nature. It is that moral factor which is to be found as an element

of feeling. Though it has a broad corporate value, we cannot think of conscience as merely a result of the moral development of the social life. Society may present the idea of obligation, but every individual must catch for himself the response which he is expected to make. The awakening comes from within.

Conscience "is not seeking neighbors but authorities". It seems to be distinct from other innate tendencies, yet it runs along with them, and it is the "principal inner agency for the remaking of human nature".[21] Conscience is not an instinct; its office is that of judge, and its function, the integration of the instinctive life. It is in dealing with sin that this great moral nature comes to its full expression.

1. Fallacies regarding sin

Two fallacies in the current conception of sin may be pointed out. The old idea that one lie makes a liar or that one sin makes a sinner, though logically tenable, has great difficulty in coming to clear articulation in life. Neither are we inclined to agree with those positivists for whom merit cancels all sign of guilt. The difficulty, Professor Hocking points out, lies in our misunderstanding of the logic of conscience. In physical things two opposites may neutralize each other. But in conscience both components are retained without neutralization. This gives to consciousness its tremendous depth. He calls this the fallacy of cancellation.[22]

The second fallacy is that of custom. We have learned so much about sin and the psychology of the abnormal that we can better understand the sinner than the less common saint. This has its philosophical expression in the presuppositions of modern naturalism

that whatever is natural is right. Because it is human to err we cannot conclude that error is not error. This would abolish the category of sin.[23]

2. The nature of sin

In the first place we must be confident that there is nothing in the original equipment of human nature which taken by itself could be called sin. To be crude is not sin. "Sin.... is the refusal to interpret crude impulse in terms of the individual's most intelligent will to power."[24] It is the "deliberate failure" to be the best we can be. It is to be admitted that the crude impulses are crude; i.e., the impulse to kill, to fight, and the sex instinct. The 'natural way' for a boy is to fight with his fists. These crude impulses could not be used today. To use another writer's phrase, the sins of today are the "outworn goods of yesterday". The moral quality of an impulse is due somehow to its "mental environment". This leads us back to the idea of the central thread of instinct which we have called the will to power, or desire. It is here, Hocking thinks, that the moral character of the issue arises. It arises from a conflict, not between two or more individuals, but between the immediate demand and the wider meaning which the impulse 'ought' to carry. There is, in fact, no descriptive difference between the act which is sinful and the act which is not sinful: "sin has all the psychological ingredients of virtue, and virtue all the ingredients of sin".[25]

In answering the question, How, if this be true, can we have any solidarity in our social organization of law and order? he admits "certain kinds of objective behavior which are so far below the level of average human interpretative power that we can assume

with all wub complete certainty that the objective wrong implies a subjective wrong", leaving room for the fact that "strong evidence" might still convince us of the contrary "It is in fact," he says, "far safer to assume that an externally anti-social behaviour is internally sinful than that an externally correct behavior is internally virtuous."[26]

3. The status of sin

Thus far in the discussion we have found nothing which could be called 'original sin': "Every man is his own Adam". To make sin a necessity would remove its sinfulness. Sin is failure to reach what is within my power to reach. Thus it is impossible to explain sin. For to explain it would show it as a necessity, the result of definable conditions. We work out the problem of sin along the line of moral and social development. Since society is imperfect, we partake of sin by being a member of society. To take the negative path and deny society would not be to escape sin, for that would be a shirking of moral responsibility to our fellow man. Man must strive and achieve, but this involves the possibility of evil. In order to gain truth we risk error: he who will not risk a fall falls by his cowardice. But always on the side of right are available the two great forces for the remaking of human nature--conscience and the central will to power.[27]

In the psychological sense we recognize the universality of error. Our interest in holiness is not sufficient to cause us to make the effort necessary in attaining it. We are satisfied with less, and thus apart from our particular misdeeds we recognize in our moral consciousness something akin to a status of sin. While Professor Hocking does not know what this entails, he is not

prepared to say that it entails nothing. Though he might not be willing to call it depravity, he will not call it holiness. But, it might be argued, is it not the nature of things thus to be? It is natural that man should be sinful and mortal. I need not repent nor do I care to be immortal. I prefer just to be natural. To this he replies that "If by nature man is evil," it still remains "that evil is not all of him". His deepest longing is to overcome death. The cry of his soul is for the "divine spark". In his awareness of and effort to rise above the purely natural, we see man at his full stature.[28]

The metaphysical implications which have suggested themselves in the course of this chapter on religious beginnings will be developed later. Let us briefly summarize and point out a few inferences and conclusions.

## Summary and Conclusion of Chapter

Instincts may be separated for analysis, but in actuality are varying manifestations of one central will to power, or will to exist. This will expresses the energized self. It ends in mental activity (intellection) of two forms, feeling and cognition. But there is an external world into which the self is made to fit, and cognition infers that two minds have agreed. Thus the first significant fact to note here is that Professor Hocking drops quickly the field of positivism and enters the metaphysical. Obviously he has a leaning toward a metaphysical a priori foundation for instinct. It is but one step and that a very small one from this a priori to the a priori religious instinct as outlined by Rudolph Otto.[29] I am convinced that a careful study would reveal many points in common between the two men.

Perhaps the most important point to note in the chapter is the

rapidity with which Hocking gets under way with his dialectic of experience. It first appears in showing the necessary alternation between feeling and idea. Experience must continually pass from one to the other. He also uses it in his conception of the relation of man to his environment and to his world. This amounts to an a priori principle. It will be more completely developed in the course of the study.

With Hocking's treatment of the problem of sin I am not fully prepared to agree. He does not wish to ground sin as an original deposit in human nature, yet he places conscience there. But what meaning would conscience have without sin? And is conscience to be found in human nature prior to sin? For Hocking sin is distinctly dis-value; it is failure to achieve. But does this exhaust its meaning? I am asking if it is merely weakness and ignorance with which the will to achieve must contend, or is there such a thing as an evil will? I cannot be satisfied with his complete silence at this point.

These are difficult questions. For the present we shall have to leave them and turn with Hocking to the more empirical task of studying the evidences of religion as found in the on-going processes of society.

# CHAPTER II

# R E L I G I O N  I N  S O C I E T Y

## A. The Religious Person

The value of religion and its transforming power is not to be judged by the fact that it has failed to make a world of saints. It has made some saints. The question of its possible power needs no more proof than a single positive success.

It does not take a philosopher to distinquish the false note of insincerity from the true flame of a pure soul, which behaves in all manner of experiences with an illumination and poise that gives at once an impression of superiority with a corresponding lack of self-assertion. There is no sign of conflict or strain. It has mistery and a fascination over which the world never ceases to wonder. "Surely," declares Professor Hocking, "the religious spirit is living as if immortality were its share". [1]

Art is long, but religion has an immediacy about it: morality is never finished, but religion says, "Be ye perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect". "There is no law of learning for morality." [2] "Religion is anticipated attainment." [3]

## B. Religion the Mother of the Arts

Here we are to view religion in the role of "perpetual parentage" to the Arts, which are in a state of "perpetual dependence". Religion is the spirit, the emotion or insight which is the soul of Art. There is little, Hocking thinks, in what we call

culture that has not at sometime been purely a religious function. The Arts have been conceived and nurtured in the bosom of religion. Though today everything is vigorously asserting its Own-ness and independence, religion realizes itself as the point at which all instincts and feelings meet. It is these feelings and insights which compose the soul of all art. The creativity which makes art live is precisely that which religion calls out in us.[4]

In his Chapter on Art and Human Nature Professor Hocking emphasizes the essential creativity of art. In creating beauty art becomes the interpreter of the central thread of instinct. "Beauty," he says, "is reality offering a glimpse of the solution of its own problems of evil.....It must return from time to time to the school of asceticism and religion."[5] In itself art is insufficient, for it tends toward independence, resulting in the inevitable loss of its vision. Here we get another application of the principle of alternation, in which the creative principle is represented as alternating between its ideal and its creative work.

Both art and religion point beyond this world of becoming to the world of being. They keep ever before man both an adequate and an attainable objective. Being beyond society, art has been largely free from the limitations of an imperfect society.[6] In contrast to this the Sacred Law, though it caught the idea of authority, often made very crude and imperfect applications of it in building up its ancient codes.[7]

## C. Theory of the State

Plato and Aristotle demonstrated the close harmony which political science and statecraft have with any complete philosophy of life. But long before their time the minstrels and sages placed

side by side their maxims of social and religious relationships.

Indirectly we may say that the chief function of the State is the making of history. This making of history is rather remote from any aim of which citizens either individually or collectively are aware. In fact a State could not proceed with that purpose consciously in mind. History appears as the incident, not the aim. When we ask for the ultimate aim of this function of history making, we find it is neither for the sake of preservation of the State nor for the sake of society, as these concepts taken alone are mere fictions--empty abstractions. But the State's aim in its history-making process is "the making of men". "It cannot make men," Professor Hocking contends, "without the long circuit of history." [8]

Hocking conceives of the State as the personification of that ideal of perfect attainment toward which man as an individual is striving. We have previously shown that the highest attainment of the individual lies in the direction of the will to power. The State is an enlargement of this will: social action continues and amplifies the work of individual experience: and history preserves it for posterity.

Life demands that man should contract or bargain away certain desired goods to society that he might receive other goods more desirable to himself. He never loses interest in these former goods, for he realizes that they must all be retained in order to insure the value of his own goods. It is the purpose of the State to supply this necessary unity to the total value. However, it must be recognized that the State can only supply the form or shell; can only concern itself with physical action. The will to preserve values and goods must come from within the individual.[9] Thus I

strive toward the ideal in a situation in which "what others wish me to be must be identical to what I myself wish to be."[10]

Hocking continually pictures the State as the prototype of the ideal individual. As in the individual all different interests and goods are unified, so in the State, as an ideal individual, all values are ideally united and conserved. In society where each man is striving for mastery of the ideal through his will to power there arises as a result the great field of competition. But "every competitive interest must be so transformed or interpreted as to be non-competitive, or an ingredient in a non-competitive interest." This is an absolute necessity for the preservation of the corporate life. Thus, Hocking contends, "It is this necessity which produces the political State. The State is the objective condition through which a non-competitive satisfaction of the will to power becomes possible."[11]

Perhaps this gives us a glimpse into the reason why a man will offer his life for the State; why all men, in fact, require the State, "as a Third Being whose power is their power, whose immortality is their immortality"--the ideal State in which man can see magnified a thousand fold the image of his own infinite possibilities.[12] These hypotheses--the necessity of cooperation with competition, of division with unification, and of the objectification of the ideal man into a personified ideal State: all implying this world of Becoming and the world of Being--together with the problems which they raise from the theme of Man and the State. Its significance for philosophy lies in this theory of the State as a type: a conserver and perfecter of all human values.[13]

There is but one theory of the State to which this stands opposed, which we wish to mention. It is that which treats the

group consciousness or group mind as having real existence, metaphysical or otherwise. Many attempt to apply such a theory in their search for an adequate ground for social unity and solidarity, without resorting to a theistic position. This view is having considerable vogue at present. [14]

## 1. Education

Education has a two-fold function. It must communicate the type,--those goods which have been accumulated by history: and it must anticipate growth beyond the type. The process has two phases. The child should first be given something positive:--the best of the type. This stimulates the development of his will and lays the foundation from which it operates. After that is accomplished he may be given room for freedom in the realm where dangers are met, and values are risked, in the hope of attaining new and better values. Society has but dimly recognized that the directive function is the only true aim of education. [15]

It is not in the vortex of the maddening whirl of knowledge, or in the intricacy of technique, that truth is generally discovered. Rather it is out on the borderland where through self-elimination and restriction of the field of interest the seeker ultimately touches that Power which alone is the source of wisdom. But the microscopic or technical, and the broad, borderland viewpoints are both necessary: to have one without the other is death. We must alternate between the two poles: now the vision, the relaxation, the clear air, the far horizon of the mountain top; now the mad whirl of the valley with its masses of jostling humanity and the

cold, cruel facts of existence as they actually are. But let us approach the subject from another angle.

## 2. Punishment

Punishment is the negative side of education. Because we must recognize the imperfection and incompleteness of any given social system, Hocking concedes the right of rebellion. The task of society lies in seeking to decide whether the outbreak is rebellion or common crime, according to the sincerity of the impelling motive. Hocking points out the great difficulties which lie in the way of apprehending and punishing the true criminal in a way that will not destroy those precise values which are to be preserved. I omit the line of argument but quote in part his final paragraph.

"Thus in the negative work of punishment as in the positive work of education, society.....seems to depend for the last quasi-miraculous touch of efficiency without which the rest of its work has a ring of hollowness and sham, upon an agency or agencies beyond its own borders."[16]

## 3. Harmony of State and Church

It has been pointed out that the State can deal only with material good. But complete satisfaction of man's will to power can be found only in dealing with ultimate good. This the Church has always proposed to do. It need not imply conflict, for all goods come through the same sources in experience. In fact, Professor Hocking thinks that "historically..... organized religion has reenforced the will of the State".

Religion calls for a recurrent abandonment of the world in favor of the absolute good. It also demands that if the insight and energizing so obtained by the will is to become of any per-

manent worth it must "make good in action". "Without the State, religion is empty: without religion the State is blind, anemic, incohesive. Religion and politics together constitute a functional unity for the will to power: the will demands both circuits for the normal function of its life." 15

Religion in developing "that part of human nature from which the very conception of law originates--conscience" has a great corrective function. Disappointed with its failures, the Will forgets the world through the power of a fresh vision; it returns, and recasts itself in a new attempt to produce the ideal by eliminating the former mistakes and errors. This is the principle of alternation.

Hocking places "conscience" as the mean between worship on the one hand and law on the other. While law is the highest rule of the State, the Church demands its freedom. Its authority must be wholly spiritual, wholly from within; thus it carries within itself its device for purification. Only thus can it speak with authority as the voice of God. On the other hand the State can compel obedience while the Church may act in an advisory capacity only, depending upon the law of individual conscience. Again, the State may not promote religion. The greater is its need of religion, the more must it depend upon the freedom of religion to supply that need. But the Church may address the State in reference to questions which concern the moral or spiritual well-being of society. The State on its part should encourage religious interest and remember its own religious obligations. Professor Hocking points out that there is a limit to the extent to which the State may be tolerant of religion, which, because of its high and independent position, is of all institutions the most subject to abuse. "The corruption

of the best is the worst."

Every State, he thinks, is based upon a particular religious type, not religion in general; therefore certain other cults must be forbidden as being intolerable to the welfare of that State. He pleads for a more wholesome friendly relationship of Church and State. When the separation is too complete and mutual they both lose. When the Church is assigned purely to other-worldly activity it loses the sense of its "practical importance and passes through an era of marked feebleness."[18]

D. The unifying of history

"Positive religion," says Professor Hocking in his concluding chapter of the Meaning of God: "positive religion in its primitive phases makes history possible." It is the great religious consciousness of man which steers life in the upward way. Nature has its value. It is persistent and unified, but too indifferent for human needs; it is not sufficient to incite a man to the attainment of the ideal. It lacks the authority of the categorical imperative. This is supplied ever afresh by the prophetic consciousness which unifies and mobilizes the streams of life, organizing society for the attainment of values and the working out of destiny.

Professor Hocking further points out four striking facts pertaining to religious development. As religion becomes world-overcoming, it also becomes independent from national life, begins a universal propaganda, and refers itself and its adherents to some distinctive historical object or person from which it takes its origin.[19]

While it is not quite evident to us that these qualities are essentially different from those of any purely human institution

yet we can see the point he is trying to make. Religion has something of permanence, and independence, and authority, and universality about it which all other human institutions, even the State, seem to lack. Religion stands as a lighthouse built upon the solid rock guiding the ships of State over the tossing, changing seas of time. It is the great unifying agency of all time,—permanence in the midst of change, unity in the midst of chaos, certainty in the midst of doubt,--this is the function of the Church in society.

Conclusion of chapter

The State has ever been historically the one great rival of the Church. The progress of Hocking's dialectic through this relationship is fresh and suggestive. In stating his view of the proper relationship between Church and State he has dared to break with one of our strongest American traditions. Complete separation of Church and State has its dangers. He has seen and pointed them out. I believe his criticism is timely. As a nation we are only beginning to sense the grave dangers of too great a separation. Neither can exist without the other, and without being in some type of organic union with the other.

Second only to this great and historic problem in importance comes the question of education. Can ultimate value be achieved through education? Hocking thinks not. Yet I think he has scarcely touched the real danger. Perhaps the surest way to become unpopular would be to vigorously attack the supposed merits of education. Yet no one is quite so uncertain as the educator himself as to what he can achieve for the good of society. A good example of the muddled thinking which is making the rounds in this field is to be found in

Mr. Parsons' recent book, Crime and the Criminal. He points out that the national budget for crime is three times that for education and suggests that we reverse these figures. "It is probably safe to assert," he says, "that the trebling of our budgets for scientific education would reduce the cost of crime by two thirds." We must preserve group solidarity at all costs or suffer still further disintegration of the social bonds. Yet a few generations ago when the majority of our people possessed little of the knowledge now common to all, the social solidarity, he says, was much greater than at present. [20] Perhaps education and disintegration are compatriots. But how either is to bring about the much needed improvement in the crime situation is not pointed out. Obviously the proper "scientific" education has not yet been devised. Hocking is right in pointing out that it is the Divine act and that alone which gives to education its worth.

We now turn to a study of religion in its distinctive function of worship and prayer. Here we should come in closer contact with the Divine activity.

# CHAPTER III

# W O R S H I P  A N D  M Y S T I C I S M

## A. The worship process

> "Worship, or prayer is the special sphere of the will in religion....it is more than an act of thought--it intends to institute some communication or transaction with God wherein will answers will." 1

Worship then is the communion of the spirit with God. Our thinking finds God as an object in the third person. The purpose of worship is to break down this barrier and come into immediate contact with God so that "he" may become "thou": a communion in the second person.

### 1. The value of technique in worship

It is this inner element of worship, called reflection, which is the important consideration. The continual danger of permitting external phenomena to take the place of worship, Dr. Hocking thinks, should be carefully pointed out. It might be well to cast aside all forms, ceremonies, rites, assemblies, sacrifices, sacraments and observances at least long enough to see that they are not the truly significant things in worship; yet Hocking recognizes their value. The philosopher, trained in the use of concepts unknown to the populace, might not miss such secondary aids to worship, though he would be in danger of constructing some of his own. I believe it is open to question whether one can reach high stages of worship with no active physical and psychical agencies of preparation. Even the quietistic types cannot be said to be wholly without these stimuli.

Religion, umhampered, would make its own fresh selection, for there has always been a distinct importance, "real or supposed", attached to this active vocal side of worship. The value of a saint seems to lie in the simple fact that he "knows how to communicate with God." The peculiarities which he possesses appear as his chief marks of distinction. [2]

## 2. Difficulty of the Mystic

Of all men the Mystic should be the best able to inform us concerning the distinguishing characteristics of worship and the ways in which it differs from the cognitive process. Though the Mystic's knowledge of worship is the most complete conception we have, yet he has to be interpreted, as he seems to be at loss to explain his own process. It appears to defy rational explanation. To the one who has not experienced something of these sacred things the language of the mystic is well nigh meaningless. [3]

### Note on Transcendence

> By delegating the Mystic as the ideal type of worshiper, Professor Hocking justly lays himself open to favoring the theory of transcendence. I don't see how he can escape this accusation. He appears to me to stand out in sharp distinction from the modern emphasis on immanence. As far as I am able to understand him this thought of Divine transcendence is carried in the background through his whole philosophy. It appears below especially strong in his discussion of religious creativity, the need of God, and the need of an absolute, and more especially his principle of alternation. It is not, however, transcendence which cannot be touched, or which excludes immanence. In fact the goal of Divine transcendence seems to be Divine immanence, as seen in his discussion of the Divine Aggression.

## 3. The negative path

In the preparation for worship there are certain important physical or overt accompaniments, the purpose of which is to direct one's attention upon the Object of his worship. Such things as

fasting, prayer, various bodily movements and attitudes, and the seeking of solitude and simplicity are all contributing agencies. This is largely a process of world-negation. Likewise the inner preparation is primarily that of negation or purgation--a getting rid of the lusts of the flesh! The ultimate end of this, Hocking thinks, is not a denial of life but a transformation of interests, for the logical end of self denial would be self-annihilation. [4] This is the good which the true Oriental mystic seeks, but is not the highest in Christian mysticism. While those of the type of Miss Underhill so emphasize the mystic "way" and explain its subjective process as to leave out any vital account of an Other's part in the process. [5]

a. Meditation

In turning away from the world the mystic must have something to turn toward. He directs himself toward his absolute good, by a process of meditation or prayer. This, in part, takes the form of self-reminding: that is, to make real to himself his own faith, to remind himself of the good he seeks. This "voluntary recollection", or meditation upon the deep principles of life, generally takes the form of prayer. Often it is but the repetition of a formula, as in the striking case of the Mohammedan prayer. "There is one God, Allah is his name." But neither concrete object nor formula is sufficient as an object of meditation. This is merely preliminary. Mystics of all ages have learned to cut this process short and bring themselves face to face with the Object of their desire. This is achieved by an inward thrust which drives the soul on toward its objective. [6]

b. Prayer

To Hocking prayer is virtually synonymous with worship. It is the instrument by which one brings himself into the presence of the Object of his worship. True prayer anticipates a Being to answer it. For, "if we are offered a man-made god and a self-answering prayer, we will rather have no god and no prayer. There can be no valid worship except that in which man is bent by the presence of the Most Real, beyond his will." [7] It is fatal to play with prayer: to pray as if there were a God, believing there is none.

The answer to prayer is a fresh insight into reality. Revelation, inspiration, and the prophetic consciousness are the fruits. The answer to prayer, depending upon the nature of the suppliant, is not to the egoist but to the simple and sincere. Closely associated with this is the "negative path", often mentioned in the writings of the Mystics, together with the triple vow of poverty, chastity and obedience.

c. The final effort

Paradoxically, the final effort is a cessation of all effort, an effortless waiting; a voluntary, but not an idle passivity, is induced and maintained by a most intense self-unification. Without this final cessation of effort these processes would turn in upon themselves in hopeless and endless confusion. This, in brief, is the Mystic's preparation. It ends in the expectation of a coming something: an answer from the Absolute. In the words of Professor Hocking this negative path is:

> "an activity ending in a voluntary passivity destined to give way in turn to an involuntary passivity when God accepts and lifts to himself the prepared soul. Its history is that of an activity of self-suppression which must itself be suppressed". 8

B. The principle of alternation

The principle of alternation in its most common form is to be observed in every-day living as a distinction between the parts and the whole, of any task or object of pursuit. We alternate attention between the several parts, and between the parts and the whole. Now in viewing the universe we have no intention of going back to the older dualisms of mind and body or God and world. Metaphysically "God and the world belong together--neither is anything without the other". However, this gives us no "maxim for historical conduct". In the course of history man can only pursue one at a time. Man can have but one objective at a time. Though God and the world are inseparable they must be pursued in alternation.[9]

1. The dialectic of worship

To recover the natural vitality and worthwhileness which life demands for its existence one must return to the whole-idea and recover that. This is the chief function of worship. And because we love life and refuse the abstractions which are a denial of it, we revert naturally, by an inner compulsion, to the recovery provided in worship. When the end of worship has again been reached the moral value once more becomes active. Hence in the life of the mystic a continuous cycle is set up in which the love of God and human ambition stand as opposite poles of attraction and repulsion. Each one in turn becomes the life of the other. The two loves or goals are, in the final analysis, one "substance" involving "alternatives in the history of the empirical will".[10]

The assumption here is that as work cannot exist in and for itself neither can worship. For worship involves the cessation of volitional activity, while the worker is constantly losing his vision.

"Thus, each aspect of life apart from its alternate becomes a mechanism. And the whole of human existence falls into two phases, work and worship: the domain of duty and the domain of love, respectively."[11]

2. The sufficient sanction of worship

"Worship, as we have seen it, is but one phase of the mystic life. Its ultimate value must be judged by its effect: by that which it anticipates. This test is twofold: it must support and find value in the world of parts, it must not only sustain, but it must create values, it must not alone reproduce, it must originate, it must create. It must answer the inner need of the Psalmist when he cried, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me". He was seeking a soul creativity. This, and this alone, is a sufficient justification for worship. It is our purpose to examine this creativity more carefully.[12]

C. Fruits of religious worship

Revelation, inspiration, and prophetic consciousness, though not used in the exact sense in which they once were, are still in some form or other the results of religion as they appear in the individual life. In the history of the corporate life they have yet another meaning as they weave themselves into the life of society and the State.[13]

1. Revelation--the certainty of religion

Revelation records itself in the form of ancient books or history, and in contemporary experience. The one should be interpreted by the other in any view of revelation.[14]

a. Truths, old and new

There are two dominant notes in the voice of the Mystic, originality and certainty. There is a seeming paradox in his originality, for it is nothing new to know what he knows, namely God. But life is new and original; the self is its own greatest enigma. To discover itself and the truth about itself is the most original, the freshest truth in the world. The truth about life and about the self is life itself. God is constant; the self is new, original, enigmatic. In discovering the one we reveal the meaning of the other. Old truths are repeated and rediscovered as often as life is repeated and unfolded. And the greatest certainty which we possess is the certainty of the self. And the certainty that God is, is more important than what He is.[15]

b. The making of judgments

As the strength of the Mystic lies in this note of certainty he needs to be careful not to be certain of too much. He may be absolutely certain of the Absolute, and of himself, but of how much more? But here a second danger arises, for certainty tends to turn in upon itself in endless abstraction. These must be avoided, for it is life which he seeks. New impressions of the world arise as the result of worship, and the empirical task of realizing them in experience presents itself. Here lie great dangers, for the new, untried, abstract judgments must be given life and content to test their validity. This fringe of raw judgment and empirical experience is the battle ground--the growing edge of truth and life.[16]

2. Inspiration--the creativity of religion

We must reject the old idea that inspiration is pure and unexplainable miracle and seek to know as much of its method and

logic as possible. Though its logic is not of the nature of rigid predeterminism, yet it is far removed from pure chance and irresponsibility. [17]

a. Possibility of creativity

Ideas tend to reproduce themselves in endless self atrophying monotony. In so far as we are dull we can only dully try to overcome our dullness, and "only he who is already wise can gain wisdom". However under certain observable conditions when one is willing to become intensely conscious of the full implication of an untruth he gains a positive outside touch which is sufficient to disorganize his existing order. A subtle and growing feeling becomes a sudden bursting conviction generally of the negative type; that is, against things as they are. We see the horrible error of it all. The tradition concerning Lincoln seeing the horrors of the slave trade and his subsequent profound conviction is an example in point. Tolstoi was primarily a man of this type. This subtle process comes about by meditation, by learning to feel or sense the untruth of the world round about, by a breaking away from the deceits of a stagnant, dead world. Hocking says it "depends upon the power to find your Absolute". It is the power to see our error in the pure light of truth. It is through the power of religion that novelty--"system-destroying novelty"--is created. "Invention is, in its essence," he says, "no rare event: every soul of man that lives and works in the world is creating at every moment of his life some infinitesimal rill of novelty." [18]

b. Nature of creativity

The event of creativity is not something independent of the existing order: it is rather a climax resulting from the total

implication of all that is past both good and evil. The word which Hocking fastens upon as the key to this is reflexion. "The old idea has penetrated to the self: the self has been stung by it; and in the reflexion thereby occasioned the new thing is engendered." This result of reflexion in which the mind arrives at a solution is called induction.

The process involves the principle of alternation. For "induction is external reflexion and reflexion is internal induction". Creativity is not so much the result of a direct effort as it is the by-product of fearlessly and truthfully viewing the Whole and the parts. Reflexion is the generalized form which worship takes in our experience; thus Hocking advises that the best way to be creative is to have personal knowledge of the Absolute. For such guidance of God "men may legitimately pray, and expect an answer."[19]

c. The fact of creativity

The important consideration is not how much or how little of the new may be found in the old, but whether or not there is anything new. The bare fact of creativity is the object of our search. The false in the past has been uncovered and corrected. The new, similar to the old yet dissimilar, rises in the place of the old. This is the supreme fact of Religion--its supreme contribution to history. Creativity to Hocking seems to be the act of knowing, which is the secret of life. It is a discovery of new possibilities of life. He admits that creativity is the essential quality of the will, but continually refers us to a previous knower in the universe. Our lives are but an "apprenticeship in creativity". He is more or less Kantian in his theory of creativity. But however much he may stand in the shadow of an Absolute, he believes man to be creative.

Our creativity is a discovery of reality, a discovery which carries with it its own self-verifying certainty. Religion is not creating anything for men, but creating men, conferring on them power and freedom to create." [20]

If we understand Professor Hocking correctly, all minds are creative and religion is the essential form or the most characteristic form of creativity. Should he then conclude that all minds and all creativites are essentially religious? It seems to me this would be a dangerous broadening of religion. Not a few writers, as for example Edward Scribner Aimes, have taken the broad view that all experience of progress or growth is religious experience whether it be the creation of a new plant by a Burbank or the founding of a new religion, or the saving of an empire. There is danger in this view which I do not see how Hocking can fully escape.

### 3. Prophecy--the flower of religion

The final fruit of religion then is man: man at his best. The distinguishing feature of this man, we are told, is his prophetic consciousness. Here we see man both experiencing and partaking of the highest values. He achieves value and he shares value, he is a being of infinite worth in a cosmos of infinite worth. Let us analyze Hocking's idea of the nature of this "prophetic consciousness". [21]

#### a. Stoicism and altruism plus

We are shown by Hocking in his chapter on the "Prophetic Consciousness" that neither stoicism nor altruism is sufficient to gain the desired vantage point. Stoicism derives its happiness in denying the value of ends. It sees that unhappiness is caused by inner conflict, not by the nature of the outer evil encountered. In fact it

does not depend upon external things at all but upon our inner method of dealing with them. Happiness tends to be destroyed by failure unless in playing the game I am able to "combine an unlimited attachment with an unlimited detachment". The good sportsman has something of this spirit. We may hope to win, but, some one has to fail. The theory of the stoic is to play the game as if the treasure were there, knowing it is not.[22]

The altruist believes that even though he may fail some one will win. There must be success but it need not be mine. I may fail, I may lose all, even to my life, but the good will succeed. These are great and noble virtues, but they ignore the individual. We are looking for man as an end, not as a means merely.[23]

True happiness is only achieved when both man and his object participate in value. This requires what both stoicism and altruism deny,--"a power over facts in the midst of finite circumstances." In whatever sense God is to triumph in history I must triumph also. Such an assurance is necessary for happiness. To possess such an assurance is to possess what Hocking calls the prophetic consciousness.[24]

To persuade ourselves that this is impossible, he thinks, is the modern form of devil worship. Men do actually possess this consciousness; it is what gives them courage to die for their convictions. It is the presupposition of authority: it is the power of a faith, the foundation of action, the joy of service, the zest of devotion, and the heart of happiness. It gives to all history its stamp of permanence, its note of reality, and its sense of direction. And it gives to man his proper setting in the course of history. It causes him to act as though eternity were his share, knowing that it is.[25]

b. Possibility of the prophetic consciousness

This consciousness is possible through the united and simultaneous action of man and God working for the same end. The only certainty which the mystic acquires is the certainty of victory over the world. The mystic tends to deny history, but the back-sweep from his experience of God, becomes a re-affirmation of history.

This prophetic consciousness is not only possible, it is obligatory. To reject one's call to prophecy is to lose one's soul, for "Immortality", Hocking thinks, "may be the chief and total object of the prophetic consciousness". 26

Summary

In the present chapter we have endeavored to study Hocking's interpretation of the deepest element of religion, namely, worship. Here his dialectic of experience which has been developing in the preceding chapters comes to the point of its great amplification in the "principle of alternation". It is an experience which carries man in persistent alternation between God and the world: between the Whole and its parts. We are not yet done with this dialectic. There are its results to be further examined in the succeeding chapter and its theory to be examined in Chapter V, but it is just here that we catch its greatest swing.

What is the result of this dialectic? Man! Man in the process of transformation? of remaking? Something like that, I am sure. And this man we are led to believe is a product of what is commonly known as worship. It is worship which produces him. Worship is not one of the many needs of man. It is rather the one thing without which man himself would be impossible. Does this mean that perhaps the man who is not a product of worship is less

than a man? Even that he is not man? Hardly that, and yet it may mean at least a going-in-the-wrong-direction. Whether or not the end, if we presume to appoint ends, which one attains in going the wrong way is essentially different from the end he attains in going the creative way where men are made, we know not. Of this he has nothing to say.

But perhaps our idealist, as Hocking undoubtedly is, is asking too much. Perhaps it is appointed unto man to be of the earth, earthy. Who can reach such an Utopia as the prophetic consciousness demands? What religion offers more than a doubtful hope for such attainment? If there be such a religion how does it attain its ends?

Others have wrestled with this problem and have come to conclusions, satisfactory to themselves. Pierce thinks that to posit an absolute or a God destroys all creativity. He wishes to think that we come from the mists of star dust, according to the inexorable law of nature. And that according to the same law man is slowly pushing out into regions of uncatalogued possibilities. We build our bridge as we proceed working from the known into the unknown. We construct reality as we advance.[27] But now we turn to discover what claims Hocking will make for the possibilities of religion.

# CHAPTER IV

# THE POSSIBILITIES OF RELIGION

## A. The human element

Man has never been without ideals: he is the one animal who has always, with purpose and conscious direction, entered into his own remaking. The question is, how is the remaking process to be effected? Not only religion, but social and political science as well, has come to realize, each in its turn, that there is a "human material to be reckoned with, having properties akin to inertia," and each has found its own ideals of life and freedom particularly difficult to maintain. Political science at last, in despair over the seeming impossibility of adequately remaking society, has abandoned its faith in discipline, as being inadequate. The only possibility for man, it says, is a change at the source. But religion, while constantly speaking ill of original human motive, has never despaired of its possibilities. [1]

### 1. What change is desirable

Conceptually, we do not know what we wish man to be. We want him to be ideal. But if what we thought to be an ideal proves unattainable it ceases to be an ideal. We have done much groping in the search for ideals. Do they lie in the direction of discipline or in the way of following natural impulses? Professor Hocking has but little time for the modern disciples of liberal religion whose hell has "burned out": whose God, remade in the image of the expansive spirit, is such a jovial fellow that he could not "denounce

anything": and whoee "native goodness of man" needs but to be developed. The way of liberalism seems to lead to disintegration, not to the ideal. And each philosophy of liberalism ends in a reconstruction upon some sort of discipline. "God is dead", cries Nietzsche, "alles ist erlaubt,--everything is permitted!" But soon after he tells us that "relentless self-mastery" is the way of happiness. [2]

To know what man should be is also to perceive in a degree the hindrances to that achievement. "To say that mankind is by nature bad is, in its origins, only a more sophisticated way of saying that virtue is difficult." [3] And the way to achieve the ideal is by some type of discipline. But discipline must not nor cannot destroy our primitive passions: neither is it safe to veneer them with an artificial civilization. We have also learned the fatality of attempting to satisfy individual desires. It is the whole man that must gain satisfaction.

Thus Hocking wants us to feel that though we do not know exactly what we wish man to be, we do know, we have discovered by experience, the direction which he should take. In the light of his statement concerning God,-to wit: We know that God is, but we do not know what he is,-this attitude seems logical.

a. Inadequacy of society as an agent

Society has been inadequate as an instrument of remaking; hence it is not competent to save him or to map out his course for him. There are two reasons for this. The first we have pointed out before; namely, its lack of a sense of reality and independence. Where reality is ascribed to it, it still seems to fail to provide scope, or might we better say adequate impulse, for the remaking of

human nature. Man's objective must be both adequate and attainable, a requirement which society is incapable of meeting.

Christianity is distinctly anti-social in tone. It is avowedly pessimistic as to what society can do for man in his present state. It has been pointed out that the whole attitude toward society was changed from one of optimism to one of distinct pessimism by the advent of Christianity into the Western world. Mysticism is a denial of the world. Today Christianity re-affirms society with more confidence than it ever has had before, as Professor Hocking will no doubt agree. Yet the great characteristic of Christianity is that it seeks for a power whose source is beyond society.[4]

b. The inadequacy of the finite God

In his article "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent to God for all Practical Purposes?" Hocking points out three things which the social god cannot supply. There is the need of peace, found only in a fundamental unity: the need of freedom and aspiration of the will: and the need of individual response and attention.

> "If there be in the universe an object upon which there can be reliance without criticism, a valid object of worship, and a source of peace, that object must be other than the social God." 5

While admitting certain values to be gained from the idea of polytheism, Hocking feels that the only value any finite god may have depends entirely upon his being an aspect of the God who is not finite. This idea of the finite god and the social god are all aspects of polytheism. As long as man is worshiping many gods he is not worshiping the true God. They are products, he declares, merely of one's own imagination, no matter how wonderful they may be; and the worship of them but serves to keep man from the true God.[6]

c. The naturalizing tendency

We have already mentioned the naturalizing tendency of religion. [7] In one sense we should be tolerant toward it, as this is the inevitable result of thinking about religion; and think about religion we must. We have also seen that ideas tend to become dry, lifeless, and habitual, and to gradually lose their sense of direction. But religion carries its own corrective with it; it is the very heart and function of religion to secure freedom by breaking through determinisms of habit, mood and thought. Worship is not satisfied with mere psychological process, it demands a metaphysical reality--a God worthy of worship. [8]

d. The Absolute as goal

But however useful religion may be, it is not an end in itself. The extravagant assertion of some modes of worship that union with God is the desired goal is a self-destroying claim. I cannot denounce the goods of this world and still live as a parasite upon the labor of others. It would be preposterous to expect all humanity to do so, for we "have need of all these (other) things".

Whatever religion is it must take up within itself and conserve all the true goods of the world. This, Hocking thinks, is exactly what true religion accomplishes. The true religion can never come in the guise of a social code, nor can it come as a denial of the world; it cannot come with a pure other-worldliness. These alone then cannot be ultimate goods. They are rather dangers to be avoided, not ends to attain. No. The ultimate possibilities, if possibilities it has, must be searched for elsewhere. Let us look again within the individual. [9]

2. A world of rebirth

"What then may this eternal religious activity accomplish for the individual; if not for all individuals, then perhaps for some, even for one individual? We would like to know if religion can make a saint. What are its possibilities? It accomplishes or at least it promises, a world of rebirth. This rebirth we have commonly called conversion. What it is can best be decided after we discover what it does. Religion commonly presupposes the individual's power of self-conscious reflection on human destiny". Might we say, then, that conversion comes when one grasps the world in its complete setting? It is a working out of one's harmonious relation to destiny. Christianity is the religion of rebirth, par excellence. What does Christianity have to say? [10]

B. What Christianity requires

In a word we can say what Christianity requires. It requires a complete transformation of the individual, on the basis of love. It is more than a change of front, it is a change of self. Must I love my neighbor? But I hate him! No pretense here will suffice. That I that hates must become an I that loves. Is this possible? Only, thinks Hocking, through extreme simplification: "except ye become as little children". [11] Before asking any questions let us see how Hocking applies this principle to some of the major instincts of life.

1. The transformation of pugnacity

Pugnacity is the instinctive agent of readjustment. Experience modifies to a certain extent the natural level of pugnacity by means of the natural educational agencies such as rivalry, contest, criticism, and achievement. Christianity does not call

for an eradication of pugnacity. It rather intends to transform the instinct into a genuinely creative impulse. This, Hocking thinks, is its final transformation. To forgive your enemy creates in him a new idea in which he may discover a better way of life. But to abolish antagonism from the world would result in an indiscriminate treatment of good and evil. It is not this which we want; rather, the establishment of a fundamental agreement which permits an activity of the nature of contest and criticism within certain limits. This is the office of Christianity. [12]

2. The transformation of sex-love

Christianity undoubtedly has a preference toward virginity, but obviously this is not its full meaning. It merely admits the non-necessity of marriage for the complete satisfaction of the will. But more important than that; it teaches that love is capable of complete sublimation. Love in its purer form approaches religion and is taken up within it. Sex finds its true meaning within religion. The question which Christianity asks is concerning one's attitude toward sex: it asks how one "looketh upon a woman". One should view his neighbor as an immortal soul of infinite worth, and treat him as such, as Kant has so succinctly reminded us. Christianity has its absolutes, but they are always such as are in conjunction with the relative, not in place of it. And the absolute has no meaning for us without the relative. [13]

3. The transformation of ambition

Likewise Christianity proposes to transform ambition so that its goal becomes the "conferring of spiritual life". It is not the desires for the felicities of heaven· there are dangers here. It is rather the passion for souls. This does not exclude the

absolute, but, as with the transformed sex-love, it provides for the relative, for the field of endeavor. This passion for souls, Hocking thinks, is the highest form of interpretation yet found for the 'will to power'. Thus in calling for the transformation of the instincts Christianity achieves the saving of the individual.[14]

C. The dilemma of Christianity

Previously we have agreed with Professor Hocking that an ideal, to be such, must be attainable. It must be practicable. Is this goal of Christianity such an ideal? It would not appear to be. At least these ideals as such have always been termed impossible, and presumptuous. The folly of holding to an ideal, in which a person must both save himself and save others, was considered sufficient proof of the hypocrisy of Christ. It was this same fact of the self-inclusiveness of Christianity which brought it into opposition with the Roman State: a State generally quite indifferent to all religious cults. And not only history, but our own experience shows us that this ideal is quite out of reach.[15] Nay, the very attempt is sheer folly, and I scarcely think Professor Hocking has pointed out the full folly of it. We must seek light from the Founder of Christianity. What did he mean when he said, "He that saveth his life must lose it?" Here is a paradox indeed. What must he lose? Life? If not life, then something akin to it? Here, I am inclined to think, comes the real force of that idea of denial of society. Something in man must die. What is it? A false perspective perhaps? Error? Sin? Self and the world? And he is born to truth, which is inseparable from eternity. Perhaps this is something of what Christianity sees.

1. Theory of "participation"

The essence of Christianity is neither morality nor ethics; it is the answer to the question) How can the demands of these codes be met? These can be met, and the dilemma of Christianity be resolved, Hocking thinks, through a participation of the self in its Object. The result of such a participation is to give man a vision of himself in his proper relation to the universe. True humility is one of the earliest and surest evidences of the attainment of this relationship. Humility itself is not a virtue, merely the necessary condition of virtue in man. But paradoxically the humble Christian may act with the finality of the gods without the slightest fear of that presumption of which Christianity has been so frequently accused. This can be done only in conjunction with the spirit of humility which says "Yet not I but....worketh in me." Here Hocking feels he has finally discovered the perfect picturing of the "will to power" with everything offensive removed. I am inclined to agree.[16]

A second advantage which he suggests is the "present attainment in a single experience of those objects which in the course of nature are reached only at the end of infinite progression".[17] This sounds as though the end of our quest had been reached at last. We are about to rejoice when the Professor confronts us with his eternal dilemma which springs up with mechanical—dare I say too mechanical—precision at every turn. To participate in the nature of God it is first necessary to see God. But it is only those who are pure in heart that can see God.[18] Perhaps "Aeons", the universal solvent of the evolutionist, or Plato's dialectic ladder with God at the top, should be called in to resolve the embarrassment. But these also even with time in their

favor have trouble in reaching the end of the journey. Once more we move the previous question: "How can a man know God?"

## 2. The Divine aggression

"The idea of salvation from the outside", Hocking says, "is offensive to our sentiment of moral independence," only as we consider the way, not the state of being. The world's two great religions of self-help, Brahmanism and Buddhism, have in the end taken on a dependence upon supernatural assistance which they did not possess in the beginning. But Christianity alone is the religion built upon this idea of salvation from without. Surely this is not psychologically unsupported, for all life points to some source of origination and maintenance outside of itself. Life is not a closed impenetrable monad.

But neither is God an unmoving Absolute. He is better known as a God of love. And love is not an abstraction, it is a force plying between beings. It is God, literally and individually concerned about men: suffering with them and for them. It is a God becoming indifferent to his own ego in his intense love for individual men. A God who breaks through his absolute that he may come to the assistance of man. This is the Divine aggression; it is salvation from above. It is complete satisfaction of the demands of Christianity and the needs of human nature. [19]

## 3. The last step

At last we have come to the end of our empirical investigation. We have also come to the end of the dialectic of experience. It is exhausted, worn out by its long and arduous journey. We have also come in a sense to the end of knowledge of philosophy, religion, metaphysics: to the end of everything, it seems, but dilemma. For

the question--Can a man know God?--may still be asked. Perhaps even a dignified professor, out of sheer desperation would be tempted to answer in the language of Ripley, that you can, "Believe it or not!"

In other words, religion does nothing to relieve the need of faith. We know that to believe in such a God and such a salvation would give life its adequate meaning and history a sense of permanence and reality which it seems to demand. But acceptance comes by faith and faith alone. Faith, Hocking thinks, is not a part of philosophies or of philosophizing; so at this point he, being a philosopher, comes to an end,--a hesitating and uncertain end.[20] I am tempted to complain at this. Has he, then, so recently made the acquaintance of faith? Must he exhaust reason to arrive at faith? It would seem rather that faith has been his constant companion. Why speak of dialectics and dilemmas and theories at all if faith is not the foundation stone as well as the cap stone? If philosophy has faith to say so much, it should have faith to speak with some degree of certainty concerning the end toward which it has been traveling: a certainty, as Hocking himself would say, that "God is" and that he is a "rewarder of them that diligently seek him."

D. Religion of the future

Finally we should like to show what Hocking thinks will become of religion. He finds himself able to conceive of the total disappearance of religion. But this in fact will never happen. Each decline of religion only seems to foretell a new outburst in which new life and truth are recovered. There seems always to be some soul who is ready to assume responsibility for the sin and

shame of a wayward people and win them back to righteousness.

The religion of the future will not be creedless. It will not be merely a religion of humanity, nor will it be identical with metaphysics. It will be a religion quite similar to the religion of today. It will have God as its central theme with the question of evil as its toughest problem. Its main quest will be perception or experience of God. It will be positive and dynamic but not essentially new; ever new in its task of creating men, new men, but old in its task of interpreting God, the same God.

Speculation has not been a major part of the interpretation thus far. The final chapter to which we now turn will be an attempt to follow Hocking into the more difficult field of theory and speculation.

# CHAPTER V

# PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

## A. Problems of metaphysical reality

### 1. Introduction

It is by the hypothetical method that Professor Hocking introduces us to three of the fundamental problems of Metaphysics. As I see it, this method has two distinct advantages: (1) It is well adapted to a broad freedom of treatment and avoids much of the monotony of tiresome details. (2) It anticipates and answers certain inevitable questions which arise in connection with the subsequent epistemological inquiry. Metaphysics asks, What is real? What is eternal? What is the nature of the backlying ground of existence? If there be God what is his nature?

There are three things we must expect of any God who is of permanent worth to us: (1) He must unify our world. (2) He must furnish an absolute standard. (3) He must be an intimate personal Being, a God of value. [1]

### 2. The need of unity

The problem of a fundamental unity, Professor Hocking contends, is quite synonymous with the problem of optimism. The pluralist fears that he will lose both his freedom and his morals in a monistic universe. But the pluralist himself will admit that no optimism is possible without some kind of unity: some character, some semblance of stability. There can be no optimism in complete disorganization. From this it is only a brief argument to prove

that there can be no true optimism until there is a complete unity of some nature. But we are in a world of Becoming. We have objectives to attain. We are subject to error. We behold conflict. The Real must be attained, it is out beyond. Both our optimism and freedom rest in the unity of ends; this is what makes them possible. Optimism demands this much: but it demands more. It demands "that the Real is the good, and not the evil". This problem of evil thus becomes the critical problem of such a monism.

The scientific attitude which through the law of cause and effect would meet every evil by the full law of justice seems to fail here. There is something to be gained by ignoring evil, by refusing to consider it, dealing rather with the good. This is not to be understood as a sanctioning of moral laxity or a saving of personal effort. For the process is not a mechanical one. To permit evil, with the assurance that forgiveness is in the offing merely augurs destruction, it is disastrous. The point here is easily misconstrued: I accomplish nothing through either ignorance or indifference. But by ignoring a known evil, refusing to acknowledge it, and turning to something good, I not only forget, but genuinely dispose of it. Optimism demands of monism that its Reality is the good, and when left to itself would make for righteousness only.

Thus Hocking's monistic world leaves room for a degree of pluralism. It is a monism which provides for the elimination of evil; at the same time it "is such only as to give meaning to its pluralism; our belonging to God such only as to give us greater hold upon ourselves". [2]

### 3. The need of an Absolute

The critical pass in the problem of the Absolute is to discover

how an Absolute may become useful to us "for deductive purposes". The failure to find such an Absolute gives rise to many examples of the fallacy of the universal. The most common of these fallacies are produced by a "reflexive turn" which ignores objective reality. To assert, as Descartes did, self certainty or conscious experience, is to assert that and nothing more. Without accepting some objective reality there remains only this subjective absolute which is a "coefficient of all experience", a "determinant of none". There is no solution for the problem of reality here, for if I can be sure of myself but of nothing more, I become doubtful of self as Hume did.

We may seek for an absolute in the realm of morality as Kant did, but when we emerge into the world of experience we feel that we have severed all relations with our absolute, and morality can not be its own justifier. Professor Hocking seems to ignore that it is just this which points out the failure in Josiah Royce's philosophy of Loyalty. We cannot simply be loyal for loyalty's sake; at least, not without ambiguity of terms. Another fallacy, perhaps the oldest of this type, is hedonism. Happiness cannot be had for its own sake.

All these irrelevant universals, Professor Hocking thinks, are essentially retrospective. They can tell us what has been but can set no store by the future, and in so far as they are solely retrospective they are self defeating. But he also finds that the inner secret which, though seldom seen, is the most obvious, is not retrospect but <u>prospect</u>. Idea goes forth and lays hold upon value and objectivity, giving meaning to the self. We <u>accept</u> this as we accept life with neither "rhyme nor reason"· it is hard to locate because of its very simplicity. It is this acceptance which enables

us to interpret experience in terms of value. Without the Absolute there would be no problem of evil; all would be merely colorless experience.

On the religious side this connotes "absolute justice"; perfection of God,—a very fruitful concept and far from being useless for deductive purposes. "On the contrary, it is the only radically creative attitude yet known to humanity." [3] If the idea of value can have any connotation for us, Hocking, the idealist, speculates that there may be something in the mere fact of Divine attention to objects which confers value upon them, and if that divine attention be of the nature of love then love of this sort may be the one thing in the world that is creative.

Whatever else God is he must at least be Absolute. Here Hocking gladly becomes a pragmatist,--long enough to demolish their argument, for the one pragmatic test of truth is absolute; that is, non-pragmatic: and pragmatism ends in consuming itself.

True, an Absolute cannot be of the 'block universe' conception. Neither can it be a Hegelian absolute which destroys freedom and puts us in a deterministic universe, where evil is on a level with good and life loses its significance.

Such absolutes will not satisfy: what we seek is in the nature of a Changeless Ultimate in our world of change. It is as essential that we move toward something as that we move at all. In the world of diversity we must find some identity. Such must be our Absolute. Suppose we take a view of life in which the self is the minor premise: the Absolute, the Major? Then every circumstance, no matter how trivial, has a meaning. "Given the Self and the Changeless is it some how conceivable," Hocking asks, "that all the rest should spin itself out between?" [4]

## 4. The problem of personality

In Chapter XV of The Meaning of God in Human Experience, we find what amounts to Professor Hocking's position toward the Personalistic school. Admittedly he must be classed as personalistic but we see him at times expressing a vague but insistent unwillingness to go the full length with them. He speaks elsewhere of the "poverty" of his thought of personality; and says that the word "person" has for him a "harsh and rigid sound".

> "It is God in external relation to me as my Other, that seems the personal God: it is the God as the Whole, including me within himself, that seems impersonal: and the true God is the Whole, as in Christian doctrine God is the One of the three persons." And again "we know that whatever selfhood we have is an involution of the self-hood of the Whole, and that our external relations to our fellows do but follow and reproduce in their own more distant fashion the relation of God to us which from his view is internal." 5

Complete personalization of God would, in the mind of Professor Hocking, be making of him a finite God. He is in perfect harmony with "McTaggart's contention that the finite God is of no worth". He concludes in these words:

> "The personality of God must be, we think, personality whose bonds are broken in 'passing through infinity': denying this infinite.....(we) must reject the rest as comparatively useless.....God becomes an intruder." However, it is to be admitted that "the balance between the denial of God and the right perception of God is most delicate, and difficult to maintain." 6

Having stated briefly his negative view let us see how much value the idea of personality has for Professor Hocking. We are persuaded that he gives it a very lofty and important place in his system. In fact Professor W. A. Brown of Union is satisfied that he makes personality the most real thing in the world. 7 If he "could not live without the Absolute" neither could he live without a personal God.

Love and the moral quality are the "most humanly valuable

attributes of the divine nature". But if God is personal and righteous what shall we say about the problem of evil? Where shall we place responsibility? The argument against God in the light of a world of evil and suffering, stands, as McTaggart has presented it, as follows: God--if he exists--has either permitted this, in which case he is not a god of goodness· or else it exists in spite of him, in which case he is not Absolute. In either case he is of little value to us. If good is to win out it can do so as well without him as with him. And if then, good is in the process of winning out, immortality need not be a part of faith in God. [8]

This logic seems impregnable; if it is, then the only god we could have would be a hypothetical god,—whatever for the moment we wish him to be,-or in reality, no god at all. But man does seem to meet God, in the realm of experience and he must be a known God--metaphysically real. Professor Hocking is in full accord with this objection. But he holds that the basic fact about all experience is that it is metaphysically real. If this be true then God must be real. Here we may view two of our teacher's great doctrines. First is the central place which he accords to experience, and secondly his idealistic conception of Nature. Both of these will be more fully developed before our theoretical argument is concluded. In regard to the value of knowledge he states elsewhere that about the best knowledge can hope to do is to classify, to relate, to state the laws for things: that it can hardly hope to find an snwer to their inner meaning and purpose; thus, experience is the more fundamental of the two.

Whatever of personal or moral worth Reality may possess must be derived from this immediate direct inference found in experience rather than from abstract theory. How are we to arrive at an

understanding of this position? But one inference need be made further. Men, as history shows, have never lived as though pain were the last word in pain. They have some way risen to the optimistic view out of the midst of suffering. They never seem to try consistently to escape it. Hardship seems even to lend a zest to life which ease denies. The answer to our question lies hidden in this secret. Is it not that there is something ultimate and external to myself--external to the competitive field of human associations, "whose relation to me is not subject to evil through its own defect"? Is it not my relation to this Other which gives me victory in defeat? Here, we think, is the very heart of experience. God becomes a necessity without which life itself would be unbearable. We live as though there were such a Reality. [9] Thus Hocking concludes a great hypothetical plea for a metaphysical reality.

I have collected other facts of importance in relation to Professor Hocking's system of metaphysics to be found outside of his formal argument and place them here before passing on to the problem of epistemology. It is here that we wish to see him more especially in his relationship to the personalistic school.

## 5. Hocking vs. Knudson

Professor Knudson discusses six fundamental problems in the field of metaphysics. [10] Of these six we have seen Hocking agree in ascribing to reality a fundamental unity which leaves room for a "degree of plurality. Second, he agrees to an essential personality in ultimate Reality but at the same time he swings strongly toward absolute idealism. While admitting that we need an Absolute which will be useful for "deductive purposes" he feels "that the God who

merely is, as our Absolute Other, is by that fact both promotive of our weal and of our morality". We need the presence of an Other Mind which stands "outside the arena of human effort with its contrasts of good and evil". [11] In his most recent book on Types of Philosophy, he defends his position thus: "There is a principle of changelessness in the basis of things on which certainty can take hold and remain certain." [12] It is in viewing man's relationship to God and to his fellow man that we come full force upon the problem of morality. While in God's attitude toward man there is something of absoluteness which is not moral but a-moral, God as Essence could we say? This and only this is what gives force and authority to God's relationship to man. We have seen that this is only one side of the relationship, or that of a contrast which exists between man and God. The story of Christianity is the story of the "Divine Aggression" which makes possible the transformation of the individual. This is the other side.

Does Hocking believe that personality is then but a stage in the development of the soul? Perhaps, but not a passing stage, rather an eternal stage. Personality loses itself as it approaches the Whole, but gains it again when it recedes. And alternation is the deepest principle of life. The soul gains definiteness only as it approaches the concrete, and vision as it approaches its Other. And the Other, some way, is both. Here, I think, it is but a step to futile speculation and an agnostic turn of mind; or if speculation be not futile, at least the speculative mind seems never able to come to rest.

In answer to Knudson's question is reality to be conceived of as concrete and individual or as super-empirical and super-individual, Hocking would say that he was not prepared to remove all the "super" from the Absolute.

Another question of metaphysics raised by personalists has to do with the nature of reality; is it active or passive? And again in Hocking's Absolute we should be forced to find something which resembles that passive rest toward which all struggle seems to bend its effort,—Being, which is at once both the end and the inclusion of all becoming. However, this is not in disagreement with personalism, for such a passive element is not given in direct experience but is an implication of all experience. Our experience is experience of God. This thought is developed later.

## B. The problem of epistemology

Practically the whole of the preceding argument has led to the conclusion that "God is to be known in experience if at all." The question which now confronts us is whether the reality encountered in experience is in any "literal sense living and divine, and directly knowable as such". [13]

### 1. Man's sense of dependence

By interrogating experience we are led to the conclusion that the fundamental and original element to be found there is man's sense of dependence. The earliest religious promptings of man indicate this fact. All the crises of life point to it. Man's earliest experiences with "nature-powers" bring him inescapably to the acknowledgment of it. Indeed we may conclude that social experience becomes religious experience only as it becomes an experience of "Nature power". This reminds us of the great Schleiermacher and his centralizing thought of the feeling of "absolute dependence" as the central fact of man's empirical self.

The handmaiden of this sense of dependence or limitation is

ignorance. But though man may acknowledge his ignorance of the world, he has the feeling that it is known. We may call this our original experience of the presence of God. Not simply the feeling "it is known", but, "He knows" is the final resting place of our faith. From my ignorance, which is not static but subject to diminution, I must assume the universe to be knowable: from my knowledge, which is ever incomplete, I realize that there is a Knower. It is only this fact, consciously or unconsciously acknowledged, which gives to the endless task of science "its necessary and sufficient warrant and encouragement." [14]

## 2. Difficulties of knowing Other Mind

Through our experiences of Nature and human extremity we wake to the fact that there must be another Mind outside of ourselves. But can we know this other mind? About this question has raged one of the greatest battles of all philosophy.

My first avenue of approach to other mind is through the physical medium. But "I have no organ for the experiencing of other mind: by the nature of other mind I could have none." There may be more intimate relations and less intimate relations, but none of these reach the mind; it is left an impenetrable monad. Others have spoken of certain signs of being, infallible criteria by which I become aware of the presence of another mind. But these also fail to give me any any direct experience of that mind. A third way is simply to acknowledge the presence of other mind because I see that my relationship with others does carry a certain meaning and value to me. But all these act on the common presupposition that mind is "furnished in advance with an idea of an Other Mind." [15]

Thus we find a degree of inaccessibility in any field in which we search for knowledge of Other Mind. What then is the nature of the knowledge which we desire? Is it not just this: we must have nothing less than that knowledge which seems at present to be impossible: namely, the knowledge of another mind.

It will not aid us in gaining a knowledge of Other Mind to divorce it from nature.

3. Knowledge of God through nature

We have not the slightest notion of how Mind in the abstract could communicate with mind in the abstract. "Reality cannot detach itself from the experience of Nature." Man's knowledge begins at the periphery of things, at the point where he makes empirical contact with Nature.

Both nature and time which seem to resist the progress of knowledge are seen to be the only culture in which idea can possibly develop. They are the necessary forms in which Mind makes contact with mind. The body is well known to be a symbol of the mind. But it is more than that. It is "an incredibly intricate and exact metaphor of every inner movement of that Other Mind": even this does not tell the whole truth, for the "body, if we take it so, is little else than the soul made visible". [16] Upon this well nigh complete idealization of space and time Professor Hocking comments further.

> "I confess that this extraordinary device by which the Other Mind presents itself in the guise of a body in the midst of Nature seems to me each time I think of it more wonderful than before. The inseparable union of two things so disparate as social experience and experience of Nature seem to be: is there not a perpetual amazement in this?..... Nature and the natural body must belong with the experience of Other Mind, even in its ideal condition." 17

4. Knowledge as the fruit of experience

We have been assured that if knowledge is to be found anywhere it is to be found in experience. The question we must answer is this: How can the experience of nature impress us with the assurance that it is true, and not illusion or purely subjective? If we were able (1) to show that this social experience was identical with ourselves and valid there; (2) then to show that it was independent of ourselves and valid there: it would look as though one had come about as near a proof of the impossible as he could. This, as I understand it, is what Professor Hocking attempts to do.[18]

a. Nature as ground and presupposition of all experience

When we reflect upon the subject of consciousness it seems that the present world is as much an inseparable part of consciousness as is the self. Nature seems to be always with me in a way that other beings are not, but when another being has once come into my consciousness his absence from mind is not a loss to my social consciousness: he has come to stay. The inference here that there was a beginning to social consciousness is only apparent. The whole system of consciousness in its three aspects--self, nature and other mind--is interlocking and complete. The end is anticipated from the beginning, in terms of the logic of communication; namely, "In order that any two beings should establish communion, they must already have something in common." We have the privilege of reducing our problem to this alternative: "Social experience is either always present or never present".[19]

We see this more clearly when we note that the only way we can judge social experience is by a judgment which itself is an added social experience. Leibnitz stepped out of his impenetrable

armor long enough to pass judgment on the rest of the monads not so highly favored. It is utterly impossible for us to conceive of ourselves as mentally alone in the cosmos. If the idea of Other Mind cannot be tested neither can it be witndrawn. Thus my idea of Other Mind is equivalent to experience of Other Mind. "This idea," he says, "is not prior to experience but is indeed prior to all further social experience." I cannot pass judgment upon self as being absent from the self; thus the copy theory fails for wanted evidence. Consciousness is ever with me and every judgment is but added experience. This argument of Professor Hocking seems to me to be almost the exact duplicate of Dr. Bowne's illuminating insight that "the categories of thought do not explain intelligence but are explained by it." Dr. Knulson considers this one of the greatest and most necessary of all philosophical insights. [20]

5. Nature as independent of consciousness

Though it is impossible to conceive myself as independent of Nature, yet Nature has a persistent way of appearing totally independent of me. It was before me and so far as I can see it will continue after my disappearance. To accept this bit of natural realism unconditionally would be virtually to deny the possibility of experience, for pure solitude if possible is perpetual. The truth which natural realism forces upon me here is that an outer objective world does exist--that it affects me; creates me, in fact. I am not responsible for my existence in it nor for the forms under which I perceive it. Space and time I accept as they are given.

What natural realism fails to see is not that the empirical world is not illusory; rather, that in and for itself it is not final. Neither natural realism nor subjective idealism will solve the problem presented by experience. I seek an Other Mind in and

through which I exist, an Other Mind also which communicates itself to me as Nature. We reach beyond our natural realism to a Realism of the Absolute. [21]

C. The dialectic of experience [22]

We are now prepared to make our final assertion as to our knowledge of God. It is this: God is the one and primary object of knowledge from which all other knowledge, including knowledge of man, is derived and secondary.

> "It is through the knowledge of God that I am able to know men: not first through the knowledge of men that I am able to know or imagine God." [23]

This knowledge of God must then be the one original and certain fruit of experience. We are then empirical knowers of God--but how? Is empirical knowledge sufficient? Bear in mind that in order for two beings to establish relationship they must already have something in common. I am an empirical knower of nature. True. But if there are none but empirical knowers in the universe there can be no social experience; for "if I have any genuine social experience at all, then at some point I do actually know the Other Mind in its knowing.....that is, in the address of the communication to me." We must assume this, for, Hocking declares, "even were there, in addition to all visible passive knowers in the world, one all comprehensive passive knower, we should be no nearer a conscious unity." Thus "our first and fundamental social experience is an experience of God." Of all knowledge this is the most certain immediate and essential,--to know an "Other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me." The dialectic of experience has carried us to knowledge of God which is primary both in point of time and value. [24]

There are two corollaries of this doctrine which I will merely note in passing. The first is that we are not independent of nature but are taken up into it. We do not create it, but adopt it. The second is that we begin as social beings and acquire solitude rather than beginning as solitary beings to acquire community.

The great central hypothesis of Professor Hocking's theory of knowledge is now uncovered. It can scarcely be over emphasized. It is the keystone to his dialectic of experience. And let us not forget; it is only in the realm of experience that we can search for or find Reality.

This to my mind is nothing short of a magnificent attempt to combine the Hegelian absolute idealism with the Kantian primacy of the practical reason. The question is, will it work? I stand and admire the lofty reach of the argument. I attempt to penetrate its implications. Will the argument stand? In experience I have found Other Mind, the most real, the one original fact which experience gives me. May I then test this Reality that I have found? Yes. But how shall I test it? It is to be tested as all truth is tested--in experience. More experience is then the test of experience.

## A Criticism of the dialectic

Professor John E. Russell. of Williams College has well pointed out the grave danger here. There is a question, he says, of how we shall interpret experience. There are at least four distinct interpretations. There is Professor Hocking's own method that experience is experience of God. But the realist with his common-sense philosophy assures us that experience of the world is nothing more nor less than whatever senses take it to be. To the subjectivist experience of Nature is but sensations of the

mind. To the agnostic or critical monist Reality is neither nature nor mind but a third something--an unknowable. [25]

If Hocking's argument for God is true is there place for a distinction between idea and experience? The two can hardly be identical. If we say they are, we have proved nothing, but merely described the process of cognitive experience. Obviously this is not what Professor Hocking intends. Neither does he intend, I am satisfied, to identify idea and feeling. He is, however, guilty of being less clear in this matter than he should be. Elsewhere in his discussion he thinks idea to be so far inseparable from value as almost to justify the statement that there is a region (that region being religion) where "fact and value coincide: where there is no idea apart from feeling, as there is no feeling apart from idea." But in spite of this they remain not one fact but two.

This is the critical pass in the problem of knowledge. I may believe in the primacy of the practical reason, may believe in the fundamental trustworthiness of reason, I may even believe in an Absolute which is all inclusive, but I cannot believe in the identity of thought and thing. My existence is more than God's idea of me. To say there is an "organic union" of thought and thing accomplishes little, for such a union would have to be of the nature of the old argument for omnipresence;—center everywhere and circumference nowhere. And while I might grant that ability to an infinite God, I cannot readily grant it to a finite knower. The nearest I can come to it is to assert my faith that in some manner--which is completely beyond my comprehension--the two are actually combined in a unitary self, so as to give life its adequate meaning. We

have here fallen back upon the theory named interaction. I believe simply because I am able to find facts in the universe which fit the case as I see it. Faith is the last fact for any philosopher, whoever he may be. Perhaps this is what (Dr. Hocking) means to imply.

There is but one more step in our study of the problem of knowledge. It is to consider some of the forms of argument which this dialectic of experience has taken in the history of thought.

## D. The ontological argument

Of the three traditional arguments for the existence of God, only one--the ontological--offers any valid proof of God. Even this argument is not a demonstration. It is but a "clearing of the mind," an evaluation of the experience of God. To find God in experience is the only possible way of demonstrating his existence. "For," says Hocking, "my power of recognizing existence is summed up in the word experience." For me to prove the existence of God is but for me to explain the way I discovered God, starting from my own particular point. Thus in a sense there are as many different ways as there are starting points--whose name is Legion.[26]

### 1. Weakness of the cosmological argument

Because nature is, a God, if there be one, must be able to account for nature. He must at least be as good as nature is. He must be as satisfactory and as permanent as nature. Arguing from nature we have no logical justification for applying anything more than efficient cause to God. If he is only efficient cause--judging by the general unsatisfactoriness of the world--he would be a very limited Being indeed. But note, our true need of God rests not on the sufficiency of the world but upon its obvious

insufficiency. Thus the cosmological argument is unsatisfactory because it can give us a God only as efficient as nature, which would be just as good as no God at all. This argument is typical, Hocking thinks of all arguments except the ontological. They reason that because the world is, God is. The ontological argument reasons that "Because the world is not, God is." [27]

2. Criticism of the ontological argument

However, it is not so much the idea that the world is not, but that it is not self-sufficient, which forms the basis for asserting that God is. The world is illusory, it lacks permanence: yet withal it is a fact which must be taken into account. Here Professor Hocking does not seem to be sufficiently clear. For even though this be true, and even though consciousness of the dependence of the world may have driven the early theologian to the ontological argument, yet no mention of the world appears in his argument for God. He asserts that there is a God whether the world exists or not. What Professor Hocking has done here, as Professor Knudson points out, is to give a valuational interpretation to the ontological argument. This reveals the defect in the older form of the ontological argument. Pure disinterested logic can never bridge the gap between idea and reality. But life, whether logical or illogical, does it constantly. This in the true sense may not be an argument. It more nearly resembles a simple declaration of faith. And whether it be declared or not, it is the element which makes life possible: it is the element of value. Value is the key which unlocks the door to life and reality. [28]

While Professor Hocking fails to make this application, he does nevertheless realize the inadequacy in the pure logic of the

older formulation. He introduces feeling. "No form of the argument can be valid which finds God at the level of thought only, and not at the level of sensation." It is not, "I have an idea of God, therefore God exists," but rather, "I have an idea of God, therefore I have an experience of God." If he were asked the furtner question, "Suppose my idea be productive of e il consequences?" would that also be an experience of God? Even my ideas of God must be tested by their ability to produce value before I can say that I have had an experience of God. In other words, all experience is not God-experience. Neither are all alleged experiences of God productive of value. (See note on Hocking's theory of value, p 72).

E. Concluding the problem of epistemology

Again we wish to see the extent to which Hocking is in agreement with the personalists in his theory of knowledge. Let us see how he would answer the four fundamental questions of epistemology as presented by Professor Knudson. [29]

(1) Undoubtedly he would affirm the dualism of thought and thing. My idea of God is not God.

(2) As to the creativity of thought, or more precisely, of worship, we owe, as Professor Brightman has declared, probably more to Hocking than to any other man. But this creativity of Hocking's tries not to assume too much. It is a creativity which must acknowledge the existence of its Absolute. Otherwise creativity of the nature presented by Pierce would set itself up as its own Absolute--the one Absolute we do not desire. I feel that this is the place in which Hocking's theory of creativity is infinitely superior. On the other hand, this is not the copy theory which is

the only recourse of the Absolute Idealist, who virtually denies freedom. The question hinges closely on one's interpretation of the meaning of freedom. There can be little genuine freedom from the standpoint of an absolutist. Yet freedom in any sense comes, not through independence of the will but through uniting our will in harmony with the Other Will, and the greater the harmony the greater the freedom. Our freedom is also such as takes into account other equally free beings in the universe.

(3) Hocking would affirm the trustworthiness of reason and,

(4) The primacy of the practical reason, as most practical Christian thinkers have done. Here he adds that great advance over Kant in that he makes experience itself metaphysically real.

* * *

Note on Hocking's theory of value[30]

The fundamental basis for all value, according to Hocking's theory, is to be found in two separate realms,- that of feeling, and that of idea.

Every unconditioned feeling or desire drives on toward its fulfilment. For this feeling, value lies in the achievement of its end. The peculiarity about feeling is that it ceases immediately upon the realization of its goal, thus the accompanying value has no permanency. The satisfaction of the first desire gives rise to another and so on in endless succession, never reaching beyond the self.

Idea, the second foundation for value, reaches out beyond the self: it is unbounded. Idea contains something of infinity about it, something beyond mere space and time. Idea seems to find Reality itself at its center, and this independence of idea from the self and its transitory feelings, while it may not have much concern with our immediate actions, has much to do with the building of their ends.

In the actual life which we live it is the constant and organic union of feeling and idea which gives meaning and content to our existence. But our existence often seems to lack unity. The desires of life are numerous, many of them transitory, and often seem to be in eternal conflict with one another. If there is anything in value it must be that which satisfies the Whole-self. Life is filled with ideas, but it moves in general toward some end, this is its whole-idea. It is very important that we have the right whole-idea.

Another difficulty is encountered in the fact that values change with changing interests and conditions of life, as life matures values change for us. But value must have something of permanence and unity about it. Thus the idea of value is dependent upon the idea of a fundamental unity in the ground of existence.

Any optimism, Hocking contends, demands this degree of unity. But optimism is difficult in a world where pleasure is so intermingled with pain. And if we investigate we find that it is impossible to dissociate pain from value, for the very achievement of value or happiness has its price, a byproduct which itself is most distinctly a dis-value. But man has never lived as though pain were the last word in pain. Evil is not taken at its face value, and pain is often the guardian of values and a producer of good consequences. We live as though the good were eternal and not the evil; as though the evil were essentially overcomable. In our field of struggle there is something which points to a supreme power rising above it all,- a non-competing power in which all values reside. Thus the theory of values rests upon the idea of the Absolute, a Being of infinite worth, compatible to every relative danger, in which every change in this world of becoming finds an adequate answer.

The religious idea and human values are inseparably connected. It is essentially in worship that man approaches the Whole of the meaning of existence. It is here that he finds his values. Through the operation of the principle of alternation, of which worship in one phase, man is able to achieve values in life. It is in this process that we come in contact with the possibility of the creativity of values.

One who lives in an imperfect world where evil and injustice abounds, if he begins to reflect upon the monstrous injustices around him, may revolt against it all. He denies the power of evil to overwhelm him and turns to worship for escape. Away from the turmoil his spirit is free to catch sight of new values which are capable of overthrowing the evils. This new value-idea he must then build into life. This is what the Prophet accomplishes. Hocking calls it the prophetic consciousness; it is the creative force within each one of us.

Thus the Absolute makes our values both attainable and adequate, a necessary requirement for any true value. The final goal of value for any of us is creativity, or re-creativity, of human nature under the guidance of ends which are essentially both good and permanent. Hocking thinks that if a man wishes to be truly creative he had best seek his goal through religion. Christianity, alone of all religions, furnishes at once both the field and the instrument for the accomplishment of this end.

## Conclusion

As Professor Hocking is not a theologian he should not be judged on the fact that he leaves out of consideration many points of interest to the philosopher of religion. In places he is so fragmentary in his treatment as to leave the reader in uncertainty concerning his true position. Several of his reviewers complain of a lack of clear and concise summary.

As with other idealists Hocking often fails to do justice "to the particular and historical in religion".

Taking his philosophy as a whole there are three great systems from which Hocking draws largely. The first is Platonism. The first strong touch of this is seen in his doctrine of ideas. They do not have the same independent reality as Platonic ideas, yet we hear him speaking of each idea as having a certain "changeless identity", and being a "center of attachment, for infinite growth of knowledge." The "whole idea" he thinks is never present. He speaks of the idea of Other Mind which can neither be tested nor withdrawn. It is thus an inescapable fact of experience. He would not think that an idea carried its own guarantee of reality, in fact, idea is the greatest enemy of the actual; yet idea has something unique about it. The basic idea of reality seems to have some present and undeniable meaning for us.

His second strong touch of Platonism is in his interest in the ideality of the State. He pleads for a renewed interest in the State. To him it is not only idealized as symbolic of man. It is the conserver of all human values and furnishes the ideal field where they may become realized. He finds the concept of State

exceedingly fruitful for illustration and analogy.

In Hegelian idealism and Hegelian logic we find a second great influence upon Hocking. His dialectic of experience seems to hold largely to the triadic formula. His first thesis seems to be natural realism: antithesis, subjective idealism: synthesis, a certain awareness of other mind. With this as a second thesis and an antithesis which finds men as empirical knowers, his synthesis finds them as knowers of the Absolute. He is obviously influenced by Hegel in his use of the Absolute.

The third element in Hocking which combines with the former two is his emphasis on mysticism. This mysticism is in reality one prong of another triad in his dialectic, the antithesis of which is the world of experience, and the synthesis the "Prophetic Consciousness" or the re-created man.[31] The two points of the trial are nothing but intuitionalism on the one hand and pragmatism or practical reason on the other. D. C. Macintosh, of Yale, attacks this whole dialectic on the ground that the only way we know anything about God is empirically,--through what he does.[32] He feels that Hocking has made worship primary, while the reverse is the truth. I have stated these three tendencies at length because they show the great streams of thought, five or six in number, from which he draws largely.

There are but two further considerations to mention in conclusion: his conceptions of God and the world, and his conception of man.

Hocking views God in two ways. From one point of view he is personal; from another he is impersonal. This impersonal tendency is regarded with disfavor by typical personalism: from their viewpoint it is but a "step into the dark". In his leaning toward a logical unity he blurs the reality of the individual.

Personalism in contrast stresses the conception of causal ground and unity.

Macintosh feels that this personal-impersonal conception involves us in eternal unrest because of the necessity of shifting between the two. God can scarcely be both, and to assert merely that he is is to assert nothing useful. It is only the moral and practical aspect of religion which is of value. Thus, he argues we need first, to deepen and clarify our experience and second to make our ideas more empirical and scientific before we can use the ontological argument, but by that time we shall not need the ontological argument, for experience will furnish the data for asserting that God is.[32] In defense of Hocking's impersonal God I will merely say that we must have some form under which we indicate the unexplored realms in the being of God. For example, is there anything in our conception of personality sufficient to account for the creation of phenomenal reality? Creativity as we experience it is not creativity of nature.

Another and more serious danger of Hocking is his tendency to deny the reality of the world. His ontological argument states that God is because the world is not. Not so. Both God and the world exist: the one as metaphysical, the other as phenomenal reality.

Hocking's theory of man is not in all places clear and distinct. Man needs to be remade. He fails to respond to the highest and best. This is man's original sin, his fall. Our problem is to discover how man is to be remade. By investigation Hocking finds the instruments of remaking in the human nature itself. The place where the remaking is to be accomplished is the field of experience. But he does not seem to give sufficient acknowledgement to the difficulties which this remaking encounters.

The importance which he places upon the primacy of the practical reason is obvious. We saw how he concluded that our primary experience was experience of God. Experience of nature and other empirical knowers was secondary. We also saw how, through the principle of alternation, the prophetic consciousness emerged and man was transformed according to the measure of his original possibilities.

Hocking's grasp upon truth is clear and strong. His philosophy is invigorating and optimistic. In purpose at least he is essentially in agreement with typical personalism. He seeks the same end but travels a slightly different path. He is traditional at times almost to a fault; change, he thinks, is often more apparent than real. The religion of the future will be essentially the same as religion of the past. In man values are created and conserved, and the dialectic of experience is the way of life. Our great religious task is in remaking human nature.

## Summary

In summary we note first that Professor Hocking has attempted to establish a basis for religion within original human nature. To do this he does not use the over-worked historical method as does Otto in his Idea of the Holy. Rather, he seeks a basis in a study of human motivations. The 'will to power' is an expression, in part at least, of a capacity for the realization of values. This is the basis of religious development. He feels that this element of human nature is best considered as having something of an a priori significance. Some have felt this to be that which distinguishes man from all other animals.

Opposed to this will to power is a contrary force at work. Man refuses to respond to the highest and best he is capable of. He begins to pervert and misuse his fundamental instincts. It is in this wilful misdirection of the will to power that Hocking finds whatever meaning there is in the "fall" of man from his original state and what is commonly known as evil.

The field of experience is the realm in which man must learn what he is able about himself and about God. The dialectic of experience progresses by successive alternations between the cognitive and the feeling faculties of man. Each one runs in turn into the other. All the experiences of life can be grouped about one or the other of these end points of alternation. Feelings alone are contentless and abstract. They ever strive to express themselves through ideas. Ideas, on the other hand, misrepresent them, and tend to make them formal and lifeless-- a mechanizing process.

The dialectic of experience is traced by Hocking through many phases of its expression. It is to be found wherever society is found: in art, in education, in punishment, in the theory of State,

and of Church and State. In religion of the more mystical and worshipful types this dialectic of experience is found in its purest form. Hocking calls it the principle of alternation. By a process of world negation and self-negation the mystic approaches the Whole. This process is known as the negative path. When the soul is fully prepared God meets it with a vision of Himself. The soul, inspired by its vision, turns its attention back toward the world, which it had previously denied, in an effort to work out the new truth in experience.

When it comes to the theory of the dialectic Hocking finds that the most immediate experience we have is experience of God. We experience God first, his world and individuals second. It is upon this keystone that the whole theoretical argument rests. And it is here that the more acute critic will attack him. However, if we hold the view of immanence held in general by personalistic philosophers we cannot essentially disagree with this position. It is the immanent God as creator and sustainer of phenomenal reality which is the very ground and cause of all empirical experience. But though Hocking contends that our primary experience is experience of God, he could scarcely be understood as meaning that the individual so understands his own experience in all cases.

There is little place for a finite god or polytheistic religion in Hocking's absolutistic philosophy. A correct understanding of the fundamental world unity which leaves room for a "degree of plurality" fulfills every need which is to be found in the older conception. This degree of unity is essential for any true optimistic world view. Again, we see that Professor Hocking contends for a fundamental personality in the nature of the absolute. But I have had occasion to point out in detail the difference between this conception and that

of Personalism. We have indicated an essential difference in his idea of creativity from that held by Positivists. They are very definite on this matter. To them the only kind of creativity that we know anything about is that of forces at work through blind law. Professor Hocking agrees with Personalism in finding the element of creativity essentially in all men. For Hocking, creativity is more that of the creating of a man or the winning of one's immortality, but its greatest work is in remaking man.

The prophetic consciousness as described by Hocking is creativity at its highest. It is with a wholesome attitude that he thus finds the highest values distinctly within the realm of religion. Man's discovery of and response to God is his noblest achievement, his highest possible realization. Interesting also is it to find that Hocking feels this note of prophetism to be the final disposition of the problem of sin. We dispose of sin not by denying its existence but by turning ourselves from it, refusing to have any part in it, and coming to full self consciousness through a proper relationship to God.

Worship calls for the transformation of the instincts. Remaking of the individual on the basis of a full realization of the possibilities of original human nature is required. Of all earth's religions Christianity alone demands this transformation. Professor Hocking shows how it demands the transformation of three of the great fundamental instincts—pugnacity, sex-love, and ambition—ending with the suggestion that the desire to win souls is the great and noble aim of the instinct of ambition. Again Christianity alone of all religions makes possible the realization of its own demands. We saw how it was that in the great outward and upward sweep of the dialectic of experience there was a God who reached down and

received the waiting soul. Without this 'last fact' the whole principle of alternation would be a failure. We wish Hocking had pointed out here that faith alone made this final step an accomplished fact. And if it is faith which is indispensable here at the crucial point, might it not likewise be true that faith is the basis of all knowledge whatever? Though Hocking does not point this fact out as we wish he might have done, he does leave possibility for such an inference. At any rate it is the Divine aggression which makes Christianity possible. It is the reaching down of the Almighty into the world of the finite and the lifting of man to the plane of his transformation, which alone can satisfy the demands of our existence. The Christian religion of all religions most fully meets this requirement: and only thus is it possible to remake human nature, and enable man to attain those values of eternal worth which his deepest nature requires.

## Notes

### Introduction and Chapter I

1 John Laird, Jour. Phil. Studies., 3(1920), 559.

2 R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.344.

3 C de Pelincourt, Hocking's Man and the State, Mind, 36(1927), p.381.

4 W. A. Brown, Hocking's MGHE*, notes numerous omissions. See bibliography.

5 See Bibliography for complete list of materials.

6 Hocking, HNRM*, p. 49f.

7 Ibid., pp. 54,55f.

8 Ibid., pp. 62f.,69f.

9 Ibid., pp. 82,84,92f.

10 See McDougall, Body and Mind, and his Outline of Psychology Ch. XXII for general discussion of his position.

11 See Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, for good general discussion.

12 The Philosophy of Character, Ch. XI. pp.158-66.

13 HNRM, pp. 97f., 98f.

14 Ibid., pp. 104,5,6f.

15 MGHE, pp. 47-48,49f.

16 See HNRM, sec.IIIfor general discussion.

17 MGHE, pp.57f., ch. VI gives a general discussion of the true meaning of feeling.

18 Ibid., pp. 57-60.

19 Ibid., pp. 60f., 136,7. See also, the Self, Its Body and Freedom (p.49) "If we try to identify the mind and body we find we must set them apart. If we try to separate them we must rejoin them."

20 For quotations in this sec. see MGHE, pp. 65,67,68,73.

21 HNRM, pp.121,2f.

22 Ibid., pp. 123f.

23 Ibid., pp.130f.

24 Ibid., p.140.

25 Ibid., p. 144.

26 Ibid., p.145.

27 Ibid., pp. 157f.

28 Ibid., pp. 166f.

* See bibliography

29 Idea of the Holy, pp.116-20. The whole book is a support of this thesis.

## Chapter II

1 MGHE, p. 30 also see HNRM, pp. 20f.

2 HNRM, p. 152

3 MGHE, p. 31.

4 Ibid., pp. 23f.

5 HNRM, Ch. XXXVIII, p.339.

6 Ibid., pp. 314-16.

7 Ibid., pp. 336-38.

8 Man and the State, p. 173, see also pp. 165,170.

9 M & S, p. 157.

10 HNRM, p. 240.

11 Ibid., pp. 227,232.

12 Ibid., p.234.

13 Hocking has been severely criticized by C. Delisle Burns, Jour. Phil. Studies, 2(1907), 410. He says that it is absurd to attempt an explanation of the State on such mystical and psychological grounds as Hocking uses.

14 Dr. Hocking discusses and refutes this theory in a notable chapter in Man and the State Ch. XXIII, pp. 339-62. In his little book Morale and Its Enemies, in a Chapter entitled "State blindness" he says further, "We regard the State as an agency existing not for its own sake, but to serve us." "It has no intrinsic rights of its own, not to speak of divine rights." (p.31).

15 HNRM, Ch. XXX, pp. 257f.

16 Ibid., p.294, also Ch.XXXII.

17 M & S, pp. 425f., also p.419.

18 Ibid., pp. 429f., 432, 437, 441, 443 for quotations.

19 MGHE, pp. 519,520.

20 Crime and the Criminal, pp. 307f.

## Chapter III

1 MGHE, p. 341.

2 Ibid., pp. 345f., 348.

3 Ibid., p. 370.

4 Ibid., pp. 373,375.

5 This seems to be a general characteristic of Miss Underhill's writings: see Mysticism, "Characteristics of Mysticism."

6 MGHE., p. 376f.

7 Ibid., p.152, see also Ch XXIX

8 Ibid., p.386. 9 Ibid., pp. 405-7.

10 Ibid., pp. 422,424. 11 Ibid., p. 426.

12 Ibid., pp. 439-40. It would be difficult to overstress the emphasis which Hocking again and again puts upon religion and worship. In his Philosophy of Law and Rights he describes worship as the "cultivation of the growing point of human nature (p.87), and in Man and the State speaks of religion as being "explorative and originative, the conscious ally of the elan vital, living at the growing point of human nature." (p 472)

13 Ibid., p. 445. 14 Ibid., p.447.

15 Ibid., pp. 447-55. 16 Ibid., pp. 455-61.

17 Ibid., p. 462. 18 Ibid., pp. 462-70.

19 Ibid., pp. 470-78. 20 Ibid., pp. 478-84.

21 Ibid., p. 485. 22 Ibid., p. 494.

23 Ibid., p. 496. 24 Ibid., p. 501.

25 Ibid., p. 504f. 26 Ibid., pp. 511-14.

27 The Philosophy of Character, see Ch. on "Final Causes."

## Chapter IV

1 HNRM, pp. 6,13f., also see Ch. XII.

2 Types of Philosophy, pp. 84,86, also see HNRM, p. 27f.

3 HNRM, p. 12. 4 Ibid., Ch. XXXV.

5 "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent to God for all Practical Purposes?" Jour. Rel., 1(1921), p. 487f.

6 The view of the finite God with which Dr. Hocking is here dealing (also see T. P. p. 83f.) should not be confused with views of the finite or limited God which have recently been set forth by theistic writers, notably, Dr. F. J. Brightman, The Problem of God, 1930. The former view held by H. G. Wells and others, is thoroughly naturalistic, while in the case of the latter God still remains the creator and sustainer of the universe. There is a vast difference between the two positions.

7 See above Chapter I, sec F.I. b., p.12f.

8 See Jour. Rel., 3(1923), pp. 568f., "Illicit Naturalization of Religion."

9 HNRM, pp.358,9. 10 Ibid., Ch. XXXVI.

11 Ibid., pp. 363f. 12 Ibid., Ch. LI esp. pp.377f.

13 Ibid., Ch. XLII, esp. pp 14 Ibid., Ch. XLIII, esp. pp.791f.

15 Ibid., pp.407-06. 16 Ibid., pp. 408f.

17 MGHE, p.31 18 HNRM, p. 413f.

19 Ibid., Ch. XLVI, esp. pp. 418f., 427f.

20 Ibid., p. 426f.

21 Religion and Modern Life, pp. 347-70.

## Chapter V

1 MGHE, p.165. 2 Ibid., Ch.XIII, esp. pp.161f.

3 Ibid., p.205, also p.195f. 4 Ibid., p.191.

5 Ibid., p.334f. 6 Ibid., p.225f.

7 Jour. Rel.,vol.16,p.242.

8 Some Dogmas of Religion. McTaggart's position is outlined by Hocking (MGHE), pp.209-13.

9 MGHE, p.223f. 10 The Philosophy of Personalism, pp.177-9.

11 MGHE, p.331. 12 Types of Philosophy, p.444.

13 MGHE,p.229. 14 Ibid., pp. 232-38.

15 Ibid., p.250, also see pp.244-49.

16 Ibid., pp. 260-63. 17 Ibid., p.264f.

18 Ibid., pp.268,9. 19 Ibid., p.272f.

20 Ibid., p.278. For Bowne's position see The Philosophy of Personalism, pp.136f., 220f.

21 MGHE, pp.282f.

22 This is the final synthesis of Hocking's dialectic (MGHE,Ch.XXI)

23 MGHE, p. 297f. 24 Ibid., see(pp.294-7) quotations.

25 "Hocking's Argument from Experience", Jour. Phil., 12, 63f.

26 MGHE, p.303f. Also see Types of Philosophy,pp.75f.

27 MGHE, p.305 for cosmological argument.

28 The Philosophy of Personalism, p.206.

29 Ibid., pp. 96-9.

30 The sections in The Meaning of God in Human Experience which give most clearly Hockings theory of value are, pp.124-38, "Idea in Organic Union with Feeling"; Chs. XIV,XV, esp. 191, 196f,207,208f and p.166f; Ch. on the Principle of Alternation, pp.418-20: "The Prophetic Consciousness"pp.488,490-93; 539-57. In Human Nature and its Remaking see pp.
Other material may be found dealing with different phases of the theory of value as Hocking develops it but the most important have been included

31 For a wholesale destructive criticism of Hockings tendency toward mysticism see Leuba, Jour. Phil., 21, pp.710-12; also see his Psychology of Religious Mysticism, Chs. XII,XIII.

32 "Hocking's Philosophy of Religion", Phil. Rev., 23,p.27-47.

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